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HUSBANDS WHO DRUG AND RAPE THEIR
WIVES: THE INJUSTICE OF THE MARITAL
EXEMPTION IN OHIO'S SEXUAL OFFENSES
Patricia J. Falk*
When you have been intimately violated by a person who is supposed to love
and protect you, it can destroy your capacity for intimacy with anyone else....
When you are raped by a stranger you have to live with a frightening memory.
When you are raped by your husband, you have to live with your rapist. 1
[D]rugging a wife to have sex with her is not an uncommon weapon in a
batterer's arsenal.2
I. INTRODUCTION
In May, 2011, Mandy Boardman walked into an Indianapolis, Indiana
police station and accused her then-husband, David Wise, of repeatedly
drugging and sexually assaulting her, and filming these events on his
cellphone over a span of three years. 3 In April, 2014, the jury convicted
Wise of rape and criminal deviate conduct after a two-day trial.4 He was
able to be prosecuted because Indiana had repealed its "marital rape
*© Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. J.D., 1983,
University of Nebraska-Lincoln; Ph.D., 1988, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Thanks to Susan J.
Becker, April L. Cherry, Jack Guttenberg, James G. Wilson, and Jonathan Witmer-Rich for their
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article, to law librarians Amy Burchfield, Neeri Rao, and
Brian Cassidy for their excellent research assistance, and to the Cleveland-Marshall Fund for its
financial support.
1 Testimony and Statement in support of H.B. 516 to remove spousal exemption to sexual assault
offenses by Dr. David Finkelhor to the Judiciary Committees, New Hampshire State Legislature (Mar.
25, 1981) reprinted in Monica Rickenberg & Joanne Schulman, Florida, New York, and Virginia
Courts Declare Marital Rape a Crime, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 745, 745 (1981).
2 Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Inferences: A
New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 1465, 1506 (2003) [hereinafter Marital
Immunity]; see also Erin Rhoda, How Living with a Rapist Could Also Mean Living with a Killer,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Apr. 25, 2014), http://arguably.bangordailynews.com/2014/04/25/people/how-
living-with-a-rapist-could-also-mean-living-with-a-killer.
3 Matt Pearce, No Prison Time for Indiana Man Convicted of Drugging, Raping Wife, L.A. TIMES
(May 19, 2014, 6:27 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-indianapolis-rape-
sentence-20140519-story.html ("' She was snippy and it made her nicer when he drugged her,' was how
the prosecutor described it.").
4Id.
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exemption" in 1998. 5 The case garnered national media attention when
Superior Court Judge Kurt Eisgruber sentenced Wise to "eight years of
GPS-monitored home confinement, with the ability to leave for work and
no required therapy," suspended an additional twelve-year sentence,
predicated on Wise's completion of the eight-year sentence plus two years
of probation, and told the victim that she needed to forgive her husband. 6
Three months later, Wise violated the conditions of his home detention and
Judge Eisgruber sent him to jail.7
A decade earlier, an Australian man, Maximilian Hoibl, pleaded guilty
to "three counts each of rape, administering a stupefying drug to commit an
indictable offence, and committing an act likely to cause harm." He
repeatedly drugged and raped his wife (of thirty years) while she was
unconscious; his criminal behavior lasted for a period of six years. The
defendant also videotaped his conduct with a camera he had hidden in the
couple's bedroom. 8 Gail Hoibl learned of her husband's actions when she
made a "chance discovery" of some of the videos memorializing the
assaults. 9 In media interviews, Mrs. Hoibl spoke of her sense of betrayal
and revealed her fear of having cancer when she experienced a host of
mysterious gynecological problems necessitating multiple surgeries. 10
Later, those injuries could be explained by her husband's conduct. The
5 Kristine Guerra, Man Drugged Wife, Made Videos of Raping Her, Suit Says, INDYSTAR (Mar. 28,
2014, 5:28 PM), http://www.indystar.com/story/news/crime/2014/03/28/suit-accuses-ex-husband-drugs-
rapes-sex-videos/7026395/. According to one new report about this case:
The woman declined to comment to The Star about why she didn't come forward sooner.
In court documents, however, she said she didn't immediately tell police because she didn't
want the now-teenage children she had with Wise to grow up without a father. She also
said she wasn't sure if Wise had committed a crime because they were married. [new
paragraph] If the incidents happened about 15 years ago, Wise would not have been
charged.
In 1998, Indiana repealed the state's marital rape exemption, which had given legal
immunity to a man accused of raping his wife. The change made sex without consent
between spouses like any other sex crime under state law. Id.
6 Matt Pearce, Indiana Judge Assailed for Giving No Prison Time to Man Who Drugged, Raped
Wife, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2014, 9:26 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-
indiana-rape-judge-20140520-story.html.
7 Kristine Guerra, Rape Victim PleasedEx is Sent to Prison, INDYSTAR (Jul. 24, 2014, 10:55 AM),
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/crime/2014/07/24/man-sent-home-detention-rape-case-now-
sentenced-prison/I 3090937/.
8 Man Rapes Drugged Wife, COURIER MAIL, Aug. 2, 2001, at 5, available at 2001 WLNR
5640141; Sam Weir, For Six Years, A Husband Drugged His Wife, Raped Her and Videotaped His
Actions; Yesterday, He told Her: "I'm so Sorry, I will Always Love You, ADVERTISER (Australia),
Aug. 2, 2001, at 6, available at 2001 WLNR 5383507; Sam Weir, Jail for Drugging, Raping Wife,
ADVERTISER (Australia), Aug. 18, 2001, at 16, available at 2001 WLNR 5511738.
9 Id.
10 Man Rapes Drugged Wife, COURIER MAIL, Aug. 2, 2001, at 5, available at 2001 WLNR
5640141.
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judge sentenced Hoibl to 8 /2 years in jail; 3 of which had to be served
before he would be eligible for parole. 11
In early January, 2014, Utah police officer Joshua Boren shot and killed
his wife, two children, and mother-in-law before turning the gun on
himself 12 In July, 2014, the police completed a seven-month investigation
into the shootings that revealed Boren had drugged and raped his British
wife, Kelly, on numerous occasions and also videotaped the sexual
assaults. 13 Kelly discovered the crime when she found the tapes. 14 On the
night before the killings, Boren and his wife exchanged text messages.15
"In one angry text to him she wrote: 'You [expletive] drugged and raped
me' followed by four more texts with just the word 'raped'."' 16 The next
day, the entire family was dead. 17 These three examples are illustrative of
a multitude of cases from the United States, 18 Canada, 19 and around the
world 20 encompassing the same sort of behavior among marital partners.2'
1 Id.
12 Christopher Bucktin, Utah Cop Drugged, Raped, and Filmed British Wife Then Killed Her, 2
Children, and Mother-in-Law When Confronted, MIRROR (Jul. 9 2014, 11:30 AM),
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/Utah-cop-drugged-raped-filmed-3831026.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 id.
17 According to one source, "Every day, three women in the U.S. are murdered by their current or
former husbands or boyfriends, and a leading indicator of their deaths is sexual assault. David Adams,
in his book 'Why Do They Kill?' found that three-quarters of women he interviewed who survived
nearly fatal attacks said their abusive partner had raped them." Rhoda, supra note 2.
18 See, e.g., Sharp v. Sharp, 2014 WL 929325 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2014) (husband repeatedly drugged
wife and kept journal of assaults); Kelly v. State, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 8596, 2014 WL 3853872
(Tex. App. El Paso Aug. 6, 2014) (husband had nonconsensual sexual contact with sleeping wife);
Dozier v. Palmer, 2011 U.S. Dist. Ct. LEXIS 85786 (husband kidnapped, drugged and sexually
assaulted former wife); Malmquist v. Malmquist, 2011 WL 1087206 (Ct. App. Tenn. 2011) (wife
accused husband of drugging and raping her); Machado v. Ryan, 2011 WL 4625748 (D. Ariz. 2011)
(man drugged and sexually assaulted wife, while they were separated); United States v. Foster, 623 F.3d
605, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 21607 (8th Cir. 2010) ("For instance, Mr. Foster's wife, Stephanie Foster,
testified that he once picked her up and threw her out of the house and that he videotaped sexually
abusive encounters with her; she also said that he kicked her and choked her and sometimes had sex
with her when she was asleep."); Knost v. Warsholl, 2010 WL 760668 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (former fiancee
drugged and raped woman); Skolnik v. State, 2010 WL 2783872 (admissibility at punishment phase of
video depicting sexual acts on wife who was unconscious due to intoxication; Skolnik testified wife was
too incapacitated to consent and admitted he had done wrong); Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228
(10th Cir. 2007) (woman raped by estranged husband while unconscious; found tape later); People v.
Majors, 2002 WL 31781126 (videotape showing appellant having sexual intercourse, orally copulating,
and inserting various objects in unconscious ex-wife); People v. Majors, 2004 WL 2729758 (same); Ex
parte Weddington, 843 So. 2d 750, 2002 Ala. LEXIS 156 (Ala. 2002) (husband videotaped himself
sexually abusing unconscious wife); Trigg v. State, 759 So.2d 448 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (husband
drugged wife then videotaped himself orally and digitally penetrating her vagina while she was
unconscious; defendant explained his conduct as effort to restore marital harmony); Blevins v. State, 18
S.W.3d 266 (Tex. App. 2000) (man drugged and raped wife; protective order against him); Spousal
Rape is Hard to Prove, Officials Say, COURIER-JOURNAL (Jan. 26, 2012), at Al, available at
http://www.courier-joumal.com/article/20120125/NEWSO1/301250140/Spousal-rape-hard-prove-
officials-say?odyssey=tabltopnewsltextIHome (husband drugged wife to have sex with her and take
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pictures); Joshua Melvin, Jurors Award $405,000 to Ex-Wife of Silicon Valley Exec, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS (July 22, 2011), http://www.insidebayarea.com/ci_18533646 (husband drugged wife
and had nonconsensual sex with her, claiming he was trying to save the marriage); Wife: Husband
Drugged Her Before Sex, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-WORLD (Jun. 15, 2007),
http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2007/jun/15/wifehusband druggedher sex/ ("The wife of former
Ottawa city manager Weldon Padgett testified that he repeatedly laced her drinks with drugs and had
sex with her while she was unconscious." "When she confronted her husband with her suspicions, he
said he was concerned with her mental health."); Laurie Roberts, I Lawmaker Stands in Way of Justice
for Married Women, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, May 22, 2004, at B12, available at 2004 WLNR 22984085
(wife was drugged, raped, and videotaped; article discusses fight to change rape law in Arizona);
Kathleen Ostrander, Husband Gets 20 Years in Prison for Having Sex with Drugged Wife, WISCONSIN
STATE J., Aug. 10, 1996, at 3B, available at 1996 WLNR 4495848 (husband pleaded guilty to having
sexual intercourse with an unconscious person and administering drugs to facilitate a crime). See also
State v. Beliveau, No. 01AP-211, 2001 WL 1286495, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (defendant threw
girlfriend down and raped her while she was unconscious).
'9 Jake Rupert, Man Drugged, Raped Wife, Co-Worker: Sentenced, Declared Long-Term Sex
Offender, OTTAWA CITIZEN (Canada), Sept. 5, 2002, at B7, available at 2002 WLNR 8213098 (man
drugged and raped wife and co-worker); Kerry Powell, Man Drugged, Assaulted Wife, Jury Told: Used
Date-Rape Drug Bought Over Internet, EDMONTON JOURNAL (Canada), Dec. 7, 1999, at B1, available
at 1999 WLNR 4713374 (man drugged and sexually assaulted unconscious wife); Amanda Morrall,
Date Raping Hubby Jailed, WINDSOR STAR (Canada), Feb. 5, 2000, at A6, available at 2000 WLNR
5439986; Gordon Kent, Defendant Admits to Drugging Wife with 'Date-Rape' Cocktail: Confession
Confirms Victim's Story, Though it was Denied in First Trial, EDMONTON J. (CANADA), June 7, 2001,
available at 2001 WLNR 6788969 (man drugged wife, but no evidence of sexual assault).
20 20 See e.g., Louisa Rebgetz, Brisbane Man Accused of Raping Wife After Spiking Her Drink with
Temazepam: A Brisbane Man Pleads Not Guilty to Drugging and Raping His Wife Two Days After
Their Wedding Anniversary in 2007, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. NEWS, Oct. 19, 2015, available at 2015
WLNR 30997366; Sleeping Wife Raped, Taped, COURIER MAIL (Australia), Jan. 16, 2015, available at
2015 WLNR 1516652 (wife believed she was drugged, husband raped her and made videotapes); Man
Drugs Wife, Rapes Her, TIMES OF INDIA (Sep. 18, 2014),
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ludhiana/Man-drugs-wife-rapes-her/articleshow/42763557.cms
(husband booked for drugging and raping estranged wife); Dean Nelson, Rape in Marriage Not a
Crime, Indian Court Rules, TELEGRAPH (May 12, 2014),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/1 0824964/Rape-in-marriage-not-a-crime-
Indian-court-rules.html (man drugged and raped wife; acquitted when court rules that rape does not
apply in marriage); I was Drugged by My Own Husband, THAT'S LIFE,
http://www.thatslife.com.au/Article/Real-Life/Real-Life-Stories/I-was-drugged-by-my-own-husband
(last visited Jan. 4, 2016)(first-person account of being drugged and raped by husband); Man Drugs
Wife for 3-Day Marathon Sex, PMNEWS (Oct. 29, 2013),
http://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2013/10/29/man-drugs-wife-for-3-day-marathon-sex/ (Nigerian man
drugged wife and had three days of marathon sex with her. The woman had just given birth to the
couple's child a few days earlier and had refused her husband's demands for sex): Woman Drugged,
Raped by "Hubby', Kin in Moving Car, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Apr. 12. 2013),
http://www.hindustantimes.com/delhi/woman-drugged-raped-by-hubby-kin-in-moving-car/story-
IftXSzHoRO8Zpg8f7x9ZJM.html (woman drugged and gang-raped by husband and two of his
relatives); Husband 'who drugged his wife and sexually abused her with a tree frog' is charged with
rape and animal cruelty, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2553988/A-husband-accused-drugging-sexually-abusing-wife-tree-frog-charged-rape-
cruelty.html#ixzz3wMhFnN00; Man Drugged, Raped Friend's Wife, YAHOO! NEWS (Aug. 6, 2010),
https://in.news.yahoo.com/man-62-jailed-raping-friend.html ("In a shocking case, a New Zealand court
Friday sentenced a 62-year-old man to nine years in prison for sexually assaulting a woman in tandem
with her husband when she was unconscious."); Reon Suddaby, Man Drugged, Raped and Filmed Wife
Jailedfor 20 Years, NEW ZEALAND HERALD (AUG. 22, 2009), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/bay-of-plenty-
times/news/article.cfm?cid=1503343&objectid=10985798; Andrew Baldwin, Brave Woman Who
Fights Against Forced Marriages, HUDDERSFIELD DAILY ExAMINER, Jan, 26, 2009, at 6, available at
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These cases also demonstrate the perils of Ohio's continued reliance on
the marital exemption for the crime of rape and other sexual offenses-an
immunity that husbands 22 have enjoyed for various types of sexual assault
on their wives.23 If the three foregoing cases had occurred in Ohio rather
than elsewhere, then no criminal prosecution of the husbands would have
been possible. Under Ohio law, if a husband drugs his wife by force, threat
of force, stealth, or deception, 24  and then sexually assaults her, the
government could not charge him with any of the four major sexual
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Brave+woman+who+ fights+against+forced+marriages. -aO192614145
("On the first night I was given warm milk, which made me drowsy, and that I suspect was drugged,
then I was raped by my husband."); Dewi Cooke, Wife Speaks Out on Marital Sex Attacks, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, (July 18, 2008), http://www.smh.com.au/national/wife-speaks-out-on-marital-sex-
attacks-20080717-3gxj.html (husband drugged wife and forced her to masturbate him); Shelley
Hadfield, Rapist Husband Sent to Prison, HERALD-SUN (Melbourne), Apr. 18, 2008, at 4, available at
2008 WLNR 7141110 (husband drugged and rape wife, then set fire to her bedroom); Doctor Jailed for
Raping Unconscious Wife, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, (Jan. 25, 2007),
http://www. smh.com.au/news/national/doctor-jailed-for-raping-unconscious-
wife/2007/01/25/1169594424888.html (wife took sleeping pills for insomnia; husband sexually
assaulted her); Clare Dyer, Man Used 'Date-Rape' Drug on Wife, GUARDIAN (May 21, 1999),
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/may/22/claredyer (London man admitted to drugging wife with
flunitrazapam (Rohypnol), and having sexual relations with her while she was unconscious. The man
claimed that he was trying to save the couple's marriage.) ; Elissa Hunt, Coffee Spiker Loses Appeal,
HERALD-SUN (Melbourne), Dec. 9, 2006, at 16, available at 2006 WLNR 21224823 (man drugged ex-
wife's coffee; wife had dream-like recollections of being in motel with him).
21 For a fuller discussion of rape of drugged or intoxicated victims, see Patricia J. Falk, Rape by
Drugs: Statutory Overview and Proposals for Reform, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 131 (2002).
22 Although Ohio's sexual offenses are written in gender-neutral terms, statistics indicate the vast
majority of perpetrators of rape are men and the vast majority of victims of rape are women. Hasday
reports:
All available evidence, for instance, indicates that marital rape is virtually always
committed by husbands on wives. ... Within approximately the past twenty-five years,
almost all state exemptions have been revised in a gender-neutral idiom, so that they now
regulate the rape of one "spouse" by the other. But it is not the case that wives routinely, or
even occasionally, benefit from their immunity from prosecution. Just as a factual matter,
husbands experience the marital rape exemption by enjoying immunity from prosecution.
Wives experience the marital rape exemption as the person who does not receive the
protection of the criminal law for acts that would otherwise be considered serious crimes.
Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373
(2000) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Hasday, Consent]. Similarly, the FBI Uniform Crime Reports
for 2011 finds there were 11,934 male arrests and 135 female arrests for rape. See FBI Uniform Crime
Reports, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/201 1/crime-in-the-u.s.-201 1/tables/table-33A. According to a recent report, Michael Planty, et al.,
the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Female Victims of Sexual Violence, 1994-2010, March 2013, "From
1995 to 2010, approximately 9% of all rape or sexual assault victimizations recorded in the NCVS
[National Crime Victimization Survey] involved male victims []." (figure omitted). The phenomenon
of male rape within prison is a separate issue. See Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CAL. L. REV.
1259 (2011).
23 In its purest form, the common law marital rape exemption provided that a husband could not
rape his wife under any circumstances.
24 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a) (West 2013).
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offenses, including rape25  (the most serious crime involving sexual
conduct), 26 sexual battery (a lesser sexual-conduct crime), 27 gross sexual
imposition28  (a crime prohibiting sexual contact), 29  or even sexual
imposition (a lesser sexual-contact crime). 30 This result is required because
Ohio's marital exemption for rape and other sexual offenses would
preclude the prosecution, except in limited circumstances, such as when the
parties are in the process of legally altering their marital relationship or
living apart from one another. 31 Undoubtedly, the government could have
prosecuted the husband with a crime other than a sexual offense, such as
assault,32 felonious assault, 33 or corrupting another with drugs. 34 However,
these offenses do not vindicate the same social harms as the sexual
offenses, most importantly a person's sexual autonomy - the right to
choose whether to engage in sexual conduct or contact with another
person.35
25 Id.
26 Sexual conduct is defined to include vaginal and anal intercourse, oral sex, and object
penetration. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (A) (West 2013).
27 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (West 2013). In a similar case, the state of Mississippi
prosecuted Trigg for the crime of sexual battery, rather than rape. Trigg v. State, 759 So.2d 448 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2000).
28 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2907.05(A)(2) (West 2013).
29 Sexual contact is defined to as the touching of another's erogenous zones. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.01(B) (West 2013).
30 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2907.06(A)(3) (West 2013).
31 See infra notes 78-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the partial lifting of the marital
exemption.
32 Under Ohio law, the marital exemption is confined to the sexual offenses. Thus, a husband who
batters his wife, might be subject to prosecution for assault. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2903.13(A) (West
2013) ("No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another ... ).
33 If the injuries to his wife constitute serious physical harm, the husband might face charges of
felonious assault under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2903.11(A)(1) (West 2013) (felonious assault: "No
person shall knowingly... Cause serious physical harm to another...).
34 Finally, the introduction of a regulated drug might result in criminal liability for corrupting
another with drugs under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2925.02 (West 2013) ("No person shall
knowingly... (1) By force, threat, or deception, administer to another or induce another to use a
controlled substance, (2) By any means, administer or furnish to another or induce or cause another to
use a controlled substance with purpose to cause serious physical harm to the other person ... (3) By
any means, administer or furnish to another or induce or cause another to use a controlled substance,
and thereby cause serious physical harm to the other person....").
35 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 588 (6th ed.) ("Even in the marriage
context, rape causes harm not protected by the laws of assault and battery.") [hereinafter
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW]; see also Falk, supra note 21, (arguing that sexual assault and
drugging for the purposes of sexual assault constitute two separate types of physical harms). According
to the United States Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1996):
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly reprehensible, both in a
moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of the
female victim and for the latter's privilege of choosing those with whom intimate
relationships are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the 'ultimate violation of self.'
(citations omitted).
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This article argues that Ohio's marital rape exemption fails to vindicate
the sexual autonomy and physical integrity of all persons in the state to be
free from non-consensual sexual conduct. This protection from unwanted,
non-consensual sexual violation should be afforded to Ohioans regardless
of the victim's marital relationship to the perpetrator. 36  Furthermore, the
state's sexual offense provisions are plagued with inconsistencies and
illogical distinctions with respect to the marital immunity. 37 For example,
Ohio law abolishes the exemption for forcible rape but retains it for
circumstances such as when a husband drugs his wife as a prelude to sexual
36 Multiple grass-roots campaigns have been launched within Ohio calling for the abolition of the
marital exemption. See, e.g., Alan Johnson, Lawmakers want to make it easier to prosecute spousal
rape, Columbus Dispatch (May 27, 2015, 7:17 AM),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2015/05/26/spousal-rape-bill.htm.; A woman fighting
back against marital rape in Ohio (Mar. 16, 2007 10:35 PM),
https://womenagainstmaritalrapeinohio.wordpress.com/2007/03/16/speaking-out-against-unfair-ohio-
state-law-of-marital-rape/; Marital Rape: A Call to Advocacy, Penn. Coal. Against Domestic Violence,
s3.documentcloud.org/documents/413656/marital-rape.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).
37 In her 1995 article advocating for the complete abolition of the Ohio marital rape exemption,
Lalenya Weintraub Siegel anticipated the precise problem discussed here:
Currently, Ohio's partial marital rape exemption statute is ambiguous and inconsistent ....
Unfortunately, the statute is worded in such a way that when a husband substantially
impairs his wife's judgment or control by drugs or intoxicants in order to prevent her
resistance, a husband cannot be prosecuted for raping his wife. Hence, a woman who lives
with her husband without a written separation agreement, or a petition for dissolution of
marriage, is not legally protected from being raped if she is drugged or intoxicated by
force, threat of force, or deception.
Lalenya Weintraub Siegel, The Marital Exemption: Evolution to Extinction, 43 CLEV. ST.
L. REv. 351, 373 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
Another commentator pointed out the inequality of an earlier version of Pennsylvania's rape statute for
much the same reasons:
The most frequent criticism of Pennsylvania's spousal sexual assault law by those who
support the abolition of the marital rape exemption is that it perpetuates unequal treatment
of rape victims based on their marital status. An illuminating example of this inequity
might follow this scenario: Spouse A becomes frustrated with her marriage and moves into
her own apartment. Her husband rapes her thefirst night she is living on her own. Spouse B
is married and living with her husband. One night he has too much to drink and violently
beats and rapes his wife. Under current Pennsylvania law, Spouse A is treated as a non-
married victim who may charge her husband with the first degree felony of rape. Spouse B,
however, may only charge her husband with the second degree felony of spousal sexual
assault. In addition, if both of these rapes occurred after the husbands drugged their wives
so that they became temporarily mentally deficient and the husbands did not use or threaten
to use force during their violations, Spouse A would have a legal remedy while Spouse B
would go unprotected under the law.
Abigail Andrews Tierney, Spousal Sexual Assault: Pennsylvania's Place on the Sliding
Scale of Protection from Marital Rape, 90 DICK. L. REV. 777, 799 (1986) (footnotes
omitted; emphasis added). See Deborah H. Bell, Family Law at the Turn of the Century, 71
Miss. L. J. 781 (2002) (noting that Mississippi law explicitly lifts the marital exemption for
both forcible rape and rape accomplished by the defendant drugging the victim); MIss.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (West 2013).
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assault. Ohio's partially abolished marital exemption cannot be justified
under any coherent theory of justice, 38 appears to survive merely due to
inertia, 39 and certainly does not serve the best interests of Ohio residents.
The Ohio General Assembly should finish the legislative reform it started
in 1975,40 and most recently revisited in 1986,41 by eliminating the marital
exemption in its entirety from the state's rape statute and other sexual
offenses.
Part II of this Article summarizes Ohio's four major sexual offense
provisions - the rape, sexual battery, gross sexual imposition, and sexual
imposition statutes.42  Without Ohio's marital exemption, each of these
criminal statutes contains one or more subsections that prosecutors might
employ to charge an individual who drugs and then sexually assaults his
marital partner with a sexual offense.
Part III explores the contours of the current marital exemption and its
three separate exceptions: (1) in the definition of spouse used in all four
major sexual offenses, (2) in the circumstance of living separate and apart
under the rape statute, and (3) in the forcible rape subsection of the rape
statute. Part IV considers whether drugging and sexually assaulting one's
spouse could constitute a type of forcible rape such that the marital
immunity would not apply.
Part V critiques the present status of a partial lifting of the marital
immunity and argues for its complete abolition. The simple fact that
current law permits a person to drug and rape his spouse with impunity
underscores the need for legislative reform. 43 Part VI proposes three steps
to effectively abolish the marital exemption from Ohio's sexual offense
statutes. First, the Ohio General Assembly should eliminate all references
to "spouse" in the four sexual offenses and from the definitional provision,
making it clear that all sexual offenses can be committed inside or outside
of marriage. Second, the legislature should enact a provision that
unequivocally states that any prior marital or sexual relationship existing
38 See infra notes 123-59 and accompanying text.
39 In People v. Liberta, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984), a case eliminating New York's marital rape
exemption, the court quoted from Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457,
469 (1897):_"It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the
time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished
long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." Similarly, the Supreme Court
of Wyoming in Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775 (Wyo. 1987) refused to reinstate the common-law marital
exemption. It quoted from another case: " * * Reason is the soul of law, and when the reason of any
particular law ceases so does the law itself * * *" (citation omitted).
40 The first change to the marital exemption occurred in 1975, when the word "spouse" that is used
in various sexual offense provisions was defined to exclude those who were seeking to terminate the
marital relationship. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
4 1 The Ohio General Assembly lifted the marital rape exemption with respect to forcible rape to take
effect on March 7, 1986. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
42 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 through 2907.06 (West 2013).
43 See Roberts, supra note 18, for a discussion of a similar case being the impetus to change
Arizona's laws.
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between the perpetrator and victim is legally irrelevant to the question of
whether a sexual offense occurred or whether the victim consented on the
occasion in question. Finally, courts should instruct juries in marital rape
cases that a marriage or prior sexual relationship between the victim and
the defendant has no bearing on criminal liability. Through this three-step
process, Ohio's rape and other sexual offense provisions can afford the
maximum protection to residents from unwanted, non-consensual sexual
exploitation without regard to marital status or prior relationship to the
criminal offender.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF OHIO'S SEXUAL OFFENSE PROVISIONS
Ohio's "Sex Offenses" chapter begins with a statute providing relevant
definitions44 followed by four major offense provisions :45 rape, 46 sexual
battery,47 gross sexual imposition,48 and sexual imposition. 49 The first two
offenses - rape and sexual battery - prohibit "sexual conduct," defined to
include vaginal and anal intercourse, oral sex, and object penetration 50
under specified conditions. For example, the rape statute prohibits sexual
conduct accompanied by force or threat of force 5' and the sexual battery
statute prohibits sexual conduct when the victim is unaware that the act is
being committed.52 In terms of offense grading, rape is a felony in the first
degree with different levels of punishment depending on the
circumstances; 53 sexual battery is a felony in the third degree. 54
The other two offenses - gross sexual imposition and sexual imposition
- outlaw "sexual contact," defined as the touching of another's erogenous
44 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(L) (West 2013). A key definition contained in this statute is
the one of "spouse."
45 An additional statute outlaws unlawful sexual conduct with a minor which nonexclusively
prohibits statutory rape-sexual conduct with a person below the age of legal consent. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.04(A) (West 2013) ("No person who is eighteen years of age or older shall engage
in sexual conduct with another, who is not the spouse of the offender, when the offender knows the
other person is thirteen years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age, or the offender is
reckless in that regard.") This statute grades the offense from a felony in the second degree to a
misdemeanor in the first degree depending upon the defendant's previous convictions and the victim's
age. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04 (West 2013). The rape and gross sexual imposition statutes
prohibit sexual conduct or sexual contact, respectively, when the victim is "less than thirteen years of
age, whether or not the offender knows the age of the other person." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2907.02(A)(1 )(b), 2907.05(A)(4) (West 2013).
46 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2013).
47 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (West 2013).
48 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05 (West 2013).
49 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.06 (West 2013). Ohio's sex offense chapter also outlaws other
types of conduct, such as importuning and prostitution, (see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.07,
25, respectively) but these are outside the purview of the present analysis.
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (A) (West 2013).
51 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(2) (West 2013).
52 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(3) (West 2013).
13 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(B) (West 2013).
54 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(B) (West 2013).
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zones for the purposes of sexual arousal or gratification. 55 These two
statutes also differ from one another with respect to the circumstances of
the sexual contact. For instance, the gross sexual imposition provision
outlaws sexual contact by force or threat of force,5 6 and the sexual
imposition outlaws sexual contact if the perpetrator knew the victim
submitted because she was unaware of the sexual contact.57 In terms of
grading, gross sexual imposition is a felony of the third or fourth degree; 58
sexual imposition may be a misdemeanor of the third or first degree
depending upon the defendant's previous convictions of a sexual offense.59
A significant parallel exists between the rape and gross sexual
imposition statutes, despite prohibiting different types of sexual activity -
sexual conduct and sexual contact, respectively. Although not completely
co-extensive, 60 both statutes criminalize sexual activity when the victim is:
(1) drugged by the offender by stealth, force, threat, or deception, (2) under
13 years of age, (3) substantially impaired due to a mental or physical
condition or advanced age, or (4) compelled to submit by force or threat of
force. 61 A lesser parallel exists between the sexual battery and sexual
imposition statutes. Although each statute contains unique provisions, both
outlaw sexual conduct or contact, respectively, when: (1) the victim is
substantially impaired, (2) the victim is unaware that a sexual act is being
committed, or (3) the offender is a mental health professional. 62
Absent the marital exemption, a husband who drugs and sexually
assaults his wife could potentially fall into Ohio's four major sexual
offense provisions. Clearly, the conduct would fit squarely within a
subsection of the rape statute that provides, "[flor the purpose of preventing
resistance, the offender substantially impairs the other person's judgment
or control by administering any drug, intoxicant, or controlled substance to
the other person surreptitiously or by force, threat of force, or deception." 63
55 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(B) (West 2013).
56 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2907.05(A)(1) (West 2013).
57 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2907.06(A)(3) (West 2013).
58 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(B) (West 2013).
59 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.06(C) (West 2013).
60 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
61 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(A)(1)(a), (b), (c); (A)(2); 2907.05(A)(1), (2), (4), (5) (West
2013).
62 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.03(A)(2), (3), (10); 2907.06(A)(2), (3), (5) (West 2013).
61 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a) (West 2013). Absent defendant administration of the
intoxicant, a husband sexually assaulting his unconscious wife might be punishable under another
provision of the rape statute:
The other person's ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired because of a mental
or physical condition or because of advanced age, and the offender knows or has
reasonable cause to believe that the other person's ability to resist or consent is
substantially impaired because of a mental or physical condition or because of advanced
age.
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Arguably, absent the marital exemption, the behavior might also be
encompassed in the sexual battery statute's provisions relating to sexual
conduct with a person who is substantially impaired or is unaware that a
sexual act is occurring. The sexual battery statute contains these two
relevant provisions: "The offender knows that the other person's ability to
appraise the nature of or control the other person's own conduct is
substantially impaired. 64... The offender knows that the other person
submits because the other person is unaware that the act is being
committed. '65 If the husband engaged in a less serious from of sexual
assault - for instance, groping for sexual gratification or arousal rather than
sexual intercourse - this sexual contact might be outlawed by the gross
sexual imposition statute under a provision almost identical to the rape
statute's drugging provision.66  Finally, the sexual imposition statute
criminalizes sexual contact with a person who is substantially impaired 67 or
unaware of the sexual contact,68 provisions parallel to those found in the
sexual battery statute. Unfortunately, the marital exemption in each of
these four statutes would operate to prevent the prosecution of such a case,
except in limited situations. 69 The next Part explores Ohio's statutory
approach to the marital immunity in its four major sexual offenses in
greater detail.
III. THE MARITAL EXEMPTION IN OHIO'S RAPE AND SEXUAL OFFENSE
PROVISIONS AND ITS THREE SEPARATE OR DISCRETE EXCEPTIONS
Many legal scholars who have researched and commented upon the
marital immunity have focused on state provisions regarding forcible rape.
They have ignored or given short shrift to provisions on sexual assault,
criminal sexual contact, aggravated sexual abuse, and other sexual
offenses. To understand fully the way that marital immunity works in a
state, however, it is necessary to examine all of the states' sexual offense
provisions. 70
Ohio's rape and other sexual offense provisions encapsulate almost the
entire evolution of the marital exemption in rape law. The statutes include
the marital exemption as the baseline or background rule in accordance
with the practice of every jurisdiction in the United States, until fairly
recently. 71 For instance, the rape statute begins "No person shall engage in
64 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(2) (West 2013).
65 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(3) (West 2013).
66 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(A)(2) (West 2013).
67 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.06(A)(2) (West 2013).
68 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.06(A)(3) (West 2013).
69 See infra Part III.
70 Marital Immunity, supra note 2 at 1486.
71 As of 2009, "at least twenty-four states retain some form of an exemption. These states
criminalize a narrower range of offenses if committed within marriage, subject the marital rape they
recognize to less severe sanctions, and/or create special procedural obstacles to marital rape
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sexual conduct with another who is not the spouse of the offender .... "72
Similarly, the sexual battery statute provides: "No person shall engage in
sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, when any of
the following apply: . .. "73 The gross sexual imposition statute provides:
"No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the
offender; cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to have sexual
contact with the offender; or cause two or more other persons to have
sexual contact when any of the following applies: . . . "74 Finally, the
sexual imposition statute provides: "No person shall have sexual contact
with another, not the spouse of the offender, cause another, not the spouse
of the offender, to have sexual contact with the offender; or cause two or
more other persons to have sexual contact when any of the following
applies: . . . "75 This language, reminiscent of the full marital rape
exemption as it existed in England and, subsequently, in all American
jurisdictions,76 provides that criminal liability will attach only if the
offender engages in the prohibited activities with someone other than his
spouse.
Juxtaposed against this background rule, Ohio's sexual offenses contain
three separate exceptions to the marital immunity. 77 These exceptions can
be understood as partially lifting or nullifying the marital exemption under
specified circumstances, thereby permitting the criminal prosecution of
offenders despite their marital relationship to the victim. More specifically,
Ohio's sexual offense provisions contain three discrete exceptions to the
application of the marital exemption: (1) through the operation of the
definition of a "spouse," (2) in the factual circumstance of the offender and
victim living separate and apart under the rape statute, and (3) when the
offender compels the victim to submit by force or threat of force under the
rape statute.
prosecutions." Jill Elaine Hasday, Protecting Them from Themselves: The Persistence of Marital
Benefits Arguments for Sex and Race Equality, 84 NYU L. REv. 1464, 1471 (2009) (footnotes omitted)
[hereinafter Hasday, Protecting Them from Themselves].
72 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1) (West 2013) (emphasis added). See the Appendix at the
conclusion of the article for the relevant statutory language in all four of Ohio's sexual offenses.
73 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A) (West 2013) (emphasis added).
74 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(A) (West 2013) (emphasis added).
75 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.06(A) (West 2013) (emphasis added).
76 For excellent treatments of the history of the marital exemption, see Siegel, supra note 37; People
v. Liberta, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 215 (1984).
77 For a complete break-down of the relevant statutory passages, please see the Appendix. Compare
Ohio's existing statute with the discussion of the evolution in North Carolina's elimination of the
marital exemption contained in Jaye Sitton, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Marital Rape Allowance, 72
N.C. L. REv. 261,283-88 (1993).
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A. Exception One: The Definition of Spouse in the Four Major Sexual
Offenses
The first exception to the operation of the baseline marital exemption
applies to all four major sexual offense provisions. As noted above, each
of Ohio's sexual offenses continues to employ the word "spouse" in its
operative language. In 1975, the General Assembly began dismantling the
marital exemption by altering the meaning of the term "spouse." 78 In the
definitional statute preceding the substantive provisions, the Ohio
legislature defined "spouse" as a person "married to an offender at the time
of the alleged offense," but the definition specifically excluded three
circumstances:
(1) When the parties have entered into a written separation agreement
authorized by section 3103.06 of the Revised Code;
(2) During the pendency of an action between the parties for annulment,
divorce, dissolution of marriage, or legal separation; [or]
(3) In the case of an action for legal separation, after the effective date
of the judgment for legal separation. 79
Thus, under Ohio law, only spouses who fall into any of these three
excepted categories are protected by the statute from sexual offenses by
their marital partners.
Although salutary, this legislative tweaking of the marital immunity is
very limited because it protects only those persons who have sought legal
redress for their marital troubles. The three circumstances embedded in the
definition of "spouse" require formal legal action terminating or legally
altering the nature of the marital relationship. In all likelihood, this reform
to the marital exemption is premised on the fact that the traditional policies
or justifications for the marital exemption - the unity theory, 80 the
contract theory, 81 and the consent theory 82 - have little bearing when the
marriage has reached a state of legal disintegration. 83  The fourth
78 This reform involving the definition of spouse seems to have occurred in 1975, according to the
"legislative history" of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (West 2013). Am. Substitute S. Bill 144
(1975). Subsequently, in 1990, the Ohio legislature changed the word alimony to legal separation in
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(L) (2)-(3). 1990 Ohio Laws File 276.
71 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(L) (West 2013). Similarly, the Model Penal Code provided
some relief for women who were under a decree ofjudicial separation. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 (2)
(1962) ("The exclusion shall be inoperative as respects spouses living apart under a decree of judicial
separation.").
8o See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 37, at 357; Melisa J. Anderson, Lawful Wife, Unlawful Sex-
Examining the Effect of the Criminalization of Marital Rape in England and the Republic of Ireland, 27
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 139, 147-149 (1998) [hereinafter Anderson]; Kelly C. Connerton, The
Resurgence of the Marital Rape Exemption: The Victimization of Teens by Their Statutory Rapists, 61
ALB. L. REv. 237, 243-44 (1997); People v. Liberta, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984): Sitton, supra note 77, at
264.
81 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 37, at 354-56; Sitton, supra note 77, at 264-65.
82 See, e.g., Marital Immunity, supra note 2, at 1497-1501; Siegel, supra note 37, at 354-56;
Connerton, supra note 80, at 246-47; Sitton, supra note 77, at 265.
83 See infra notes 123-40 and accompanying text.
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traditional rationale - women as the property or chattel of their husbands
- has been similarly discredited. 84
As noted above, Ohio's three other major sexual offense provisions -
sexual battery, gross sexual imposition, and sexual imposition - also
incorporate the term "spouse" in their operative provisions. This means
that the exclusions contained in the definition of spouse would also apply
to these other offenses. For instance, a husband could be prosecuted for
sexual battery if he has sexual intercourse with his unconscious/unaware
wife during their legal separation. Thus, the weakest lifting of the marital
exemption - the one that only pertains to those marital partners who have
sought to change the legal status of their relationship - has the widest
applicability in terms of the sexual offense provisions. In other words, the
marital exemption remains in full effect in Ohio's sexual battery, gross
sexual imposition, and sexual imposition statutes except when the parties
have legally altered their marriage. The problem, of course, with altering
the definition of spouse in this fashion to protect those persons who are
legally separated or getting divorced is that those who are factually, but not
legally, separated or who are still living with their abusive spouses will
receive no similar protection. 85 The background marital immunity rule
would continue to prevent any prosecution in those circumstances.
B. Exception Two.- Living Separate and Apart from the Offender in
the Rape Statute
Ohio's rape statute, and only the rape statute, contains a second discrete
exception to the background rule of marital immunity. In 1985, the Ohio
General Assembly added the highlighted language to the Ohio rape statute:
"No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another who is not the
spouse of the offender or who is the spouse of the offender but is living
separate and apart from the offender[]"86  This additional language
expands the coverage of the rape statute to those who are factually living
separate and apart from the defendant without formally changing their legal
84 Emily R. Brown, Changing the Marital Rape Exemption: I Am Chattel(?!); Hear Me Roar, 18
Am. J. Trial Advoc. 657 (1995); see also Lisa Dawgert Waggoner, New Mexico Joins the Twentieth
Century: The Repeal of the Marital Rape Exemption, 22 N.M. L. Rev. 551, 552-54 (1992); Sunn v.
State, 742 P.2d 775 (Wyo. 1987) (discussing property, unity, and consent theories as "unrealistic and
unreasonable"); State v. Morrison, 85 N.J. 193 (1981) (dismissing three major common law
justifications for marital exemption).
" See Abigail Andrews Tiemey, Spousal Sexual Assault: Pennsylvania's Place on the Sliding Scale
of Protection from Marital Rape, 90 DICK. L. REV. 777 (1986) (discussing the inequity resulting from
treating these cases differently).
86 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1) (West 2013) (emphasis added). 1985-86 vol. 141 pt. II
4480 1985 (Am. Substitute H.B. 475). According to the Ohio Pattern Jury Instructions: "'Living
separate and apart"' means the (people) (husband and wife) are living in separate accommodations and
apart from each other." 2 OJI-CR 507.02(A)(1), 2 CR Ohio Jury Instructions 507.02(A)(1).
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status under the definition found in Ohio Revised Code § 2907.01(L).8 7 In
this way, some additional number of spouses would be protected from rape
by their estranged husbands. 88 One might ask why the Ohio legislature did
not simply add the factual circumstance of living separate and apart to the
list of exceptions in the definition of "spouse." The answer appears to lie
in the fact that the rape statute is the only one of Ohio's four primary sexual
offenses that contains this additional language about spouses living
separate and apart. Thus, a wife who is living separate and apart from her
husband without the benefit of a legally recognized separation agreement, a
divorce action, or other formal proceeding, will be protected from the crime
of rape in all of its forms,89 but not from the other three crimes of sexual
battery, gross sexual imposition, or sexual imposition. To be protected by
these other sexual offense categories, the victim will have to fall within the
exceptions listed in the definition of "spouse" made applicable to all sexual
crimes. Thus, it appears that the Ohio legislature sought to lift the
exemption to a greater extent for the crime of rape than for the other sexual
offenses.
C. Exception Three: The Forcible Compulsion Subsection of the
Rape Statute
To make matters even more complex, Ohio's rape statute (and again
only the rape statute) has an additional exception to the marital exemption.
Recall that Ohio's rape statute contains four substantive provisions: (1)
drugging a victim to accomplish sexual conduct, (2) having sexual conduct
with someone under 13 years of age, (3) accomplishing sexual conduct
with a mentally or physically incapacitated person, and (4) compelling the
victim to submit by force or threat of force.90  Subsection (A)(1)
encompasses the first three types of rape;91 Subsection (A)(2) consists of
the "forcible" rape provision: "when the offender purposely compels the
other person to submit by force or threat of force." 92
Although all forms of rape are still rape and punishable as such, forcible
rape under subsection (A)(2) is treated differently when it comes to the
marital exemption. In 1986, the Ohio General Assembly passed the
following provision, its most recent major enactment concerning the
87 This revision to the rape statute occurred in 1985 in conjunction with a new provision making
marriage irrelevant in the context of forcible rape. See Am. Substitute H.B. 475 (1985).88 By "'protected," I mean that a prosecutor could charge their estranged husbands with the crime of
rape or another sexual offense.
89 This additional lifting of the marital exemption applies whether the defendant accomplishes rape
by surreptitious, forcible, or deceptive drugging, involves a substantially impaired victim, or a victim
below the age of 13 years old or by the use of forcible compulsion. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2907.02(A)(1)(a)-(c), (A)(2) (West 2013).
90 See supra Section II.
91 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1) (West 2013).
92 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(2) (West 2013).
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marital immunity: 93 "It is not a defense to a charge under division (A)(2) of
this section that the offender and the victim were married or were co-
habiting at the time of the commission of the offense." 94 Thus, the Ohio
legislature has abolished the marital exemption for forcible rape. 95 A
husband who rapes his wife by force or threat of force can be prosecuted
whether the couple are actively cohabiting, living separate and apart, or in
the process of legally altering their relationship. In short, the Ohio
legislature made the existence of a marital relationship between offender
and victim completely irrelevant to criminal liability when the offender
uses forcible compulsion to accomplish rape.
The following comment appears in connection with the Ohio Jury
Instructions on rape: "The Committee believes that with the enactment of
R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), forcible sexual conduct with a spouse is rape. The
common law (and statutory) defenses of implied consent and 'the wife is a
man's chattel' no longer exist."'96 Although the policy reasons for
eliminating the marital immunity apply to all types of rape, the legislature
did not fully abolish the exemption. Rather, if the husband accomplishes
rape by means that do not meet the definition of force or threat of force,
then the marital immunity would bar the prosecution, unless the first two
exceptions to the marital immunity applied. Thus, a husband is immune
from prosecution if he drugs his wife and then has sexual intercourse with
her 97 or if he sexually assaults his wife when she is incapacitated because
of a mental or physical condition or because of advanced age, 98 provided
93 This revision to the rape statute occurred in 1985 (became effective in 1986), and represents the
most recent change regarding the marital immunity, except for changing the word alimony to legal
separation in the definition of spouse that occurred in 1990.
94 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G) (West 2013). See Am. Substitute H.B. 475 (1985).
9' When searching for the Ohio rape statute on the legal database on Westlaw, this caption appears
above OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2013): "Rape; evidence; marriage or cohabitation not
defenses to rape charges," giving the mistaken impression that marriage or cohabitation are not defenses
to all types of rape when that is not the case.
9' 2-CR 507 OI 507.02(A)(1).
97 Marital Immunity, supra note 2, at 1468 reports:
In three of these states-Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Carolina-men are even immune
from charges when they themselves administer the drugs, intoxicants, or controlled
substances to render their wives mentally incapacitated. In eight other states, men are
immune from charges when their wives are rendered incapable of consenting due to drugs
or intoxicants administered without consent, which may include when a husband
administers intoxicants without his wife's consent. Id. (footnotes omitted).
98 According to the same source:
Twenty states exempt men from sexual offense charges when their wives are mentally
incapacitated or physically helpless. "Mentally incapacitated" is usually defined as so
drugged or intoxicated that one cannot give valid consent. "Physically helpless" is usually
defined as unconscious, which includes unconsciousness due to drugging or a coma, for
example. In these twenty states, penetrating a woman who cannot consent because she is
drugged or unconscious is a crime if the man is not married to the victim. However, it is
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that they are not living separate and apart or legally altering their
relationship under the statutory language found in the definition of
spouse. 99
It is ironic that the broadest exception to the marital immunity is also
the narrowest in scope because it does not apply to any of the other Ohio
sexual offenses. No similar language appears, for instance, in the gross
sexual imposition statute that punishes those who engage in sexual contact
with another by force or threat of force - the parallel provision to the rape
statute's subsection (A)(2). 100 The three other major sexual offenses under
Ohio law have a much more limited lifting of the marital exemption,
relying exclusively upon the definitional exceptions to "spouse" - legally
separated or currently divorcing - to provide a partial lifting of the
exemption. The tripartite lifting of the marital exemption is confined to
Ohio's rape statute.
In summary, spouses in Ohio are protected from all forms of non-
consensual sexual conduct and sexual contact if they are in the process of
altering their legal relationship, i.e., by getting an annulment, divorce,
dissolution, or legally separating. If the spouses are living separate and
apart, they are also protected from various types of rape, those that do and
do not include "forcible compulsion," such as being drugged as a prelude to
the sexual assault; none of the other sexual offenses include this language.
Finally, if the offender used force to compel his spouse to submit to sexual
intercourse (forcible rape), then Ohio spouses receive the full measure of
protection against rape - even if they are cohabiting with the offender.
However, cohabiting spouses would not be protected from other types of
"non-forcible" rape, such as being drugged and sexually assaulted, or less
serious types of sexual offenses. Thus, Ohio's rape and sexual offense
provisions contain a complex, multi-tiered partial lifting of the marital
exemption, possibly graded by the perceived seriousness of the completed
offense, but lacking any other organizational structure.
IV. DOES OHIO'S FORCIBLE RAPE SUBSECTION ENCOMPASS A HUSBAND
WHO DRUGS AND THEN RAPES HIS WIFE?
Before discussing the continued vitality of the marital exemption in
Ohio's sexual offense provisions, it is prudent to consider whether the
conduct described at the beginning of this article - a husband drugging and
then sexually assaulting his wife - would fit under the forcible compulsion
not a crime if the man is married to the victim. Marital Immunity, supra note 2, at 1468
(footnotes omitted).
See also Rhoda, supra note 2, ("In others, it's permitted for a husband to force sex if his wife is
mentally incapacitated.").
99 See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
100 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(A)(1) (West 2013) ("The offender purposely compels the other
person, or one of the other persons, to submit by force or threat of force.").
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provision of the rape statute and thereby deprive the husband of immunity
from a rape prosecution. 101 Trigg v. State provides a helpful starting point
in answering this question 102 Trigg is a Mississippi case involving a
husband who drugged and sexually assaulted his wife, in which the state
chose to prosecute the husband for sexual battery, rather than rape. 103 The
jurisdiction's sexual battery statute contained the marital exemption, but
also made it inapplicable if force was used in committing the offense. 104
Trigg claimed that he should be granted the marital immunity because he
did not use force (he used drugs) as required by the statutory exception. In
upholding the conviction, the appellate court reasoned: "In any event,
rendering her unconscious with drugs, physically undressing her and
sexually penetrating her all require some amount of force. Therefore, this
argument is without merit." 10 5  Thus, the Trigg court equated the
administration of the drugs with the use of "force" to satisfy the statutory
language. 106 Could a similar argument be made under Ohio law?
101 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G) (West 2013).
102 Trigg v. State, 759 So.2d 448 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
103 See id. This decision to charge the defendant with a lesser form of sexual assault emphasizes that
the marital exemption is not simply a problem regarding the jurisdiction's rape statute, but also effects
lesser crimes such as sexual battery or gross sexual imposition.
104 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2013), entitled Sexual Battery, Defense of Marriage, provides:
A person is not guilty of any offense under Sections 97-3-95 through 97-3-103 if the
alleged victim is that person's legal spouse and at the time of the alleged offense such
person and the alleged victim are not separated and living apart; provided, however, that
the legal spouse of the alleged victim may be found guilty of sexual battery if the legal
spouse engaged in forcible sexual penetration without the consent of the alleged victim.
See also Nourse, Symposium on Unfurnished Feminist Business: The "Normal" Success and Failures
of Feminism and the Criminal Law, 75 CHI-KENT. L. REV. 951, 963 (2000) (discussing Mississippi's
sexual battery statute and the marital exemption).
105 Trigg v. State, 759 So.2d at 451. See also Deborah H. Bell, Family Law at the Turn of the
Century, 71 MIss. L. J. 781 (2002) (noting that Mississippi law explicitly lifts the marital exemption for
both forcible rape and rape accomplished by the defendant drugging the victim). The law states:
(4)(a) Every person who shall have forcible sexual intercourse with any person, or who
shall have sexual intercourse not constituting forcible sexual intercourse or statutory rape
with any person without that person's consent by administering to such person any
substance or liquid which shall produce such stupor or such imbecility of mind or weakness
of body as to prevent effectual resistance, upon conviction, shall be imprisoned for life in
the State Penitentiary if the jury by its verdict so prescribes; ....
(b) This subsection (4) shall apply whether the perpetrator is married to the victim or not.
MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (West 2013).
106 Anderson makes a similar point in her excellent article on the marital exemption:
The use of drugs is analogous to the use of physical force to render a woman incapacitated.
Some men beat or choke their wives to render them unconscious before raping them. ...
Although most states would recognize the choking here as force that makes the sexual
offense rape, too many states would not recognize drugging a wife for the identical purpose
as force that makes the sexual offense rape. Marital Immunity, supra note 2, at 1507
(footnotes omitted).
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Interpreting Ohio's forcible rape subsection to include the circumstance
when a husband administers a drug to his wife and subsequently rapes her
is problematic for a number of reasons. First, the rape statute contains a
separate provision that specifically covers the precise circumstance of an
offender using drugs to subdue the victim as a prelude to sexual assault. 107
An important rule of statutory construction is that the courts should give
effect to statutory provisions without rendering other provisions as
surplusage. According to the United States Supreme Court, "one of the
most basic interpretive canons [states] that '[a] statute should be construed
so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant. "' 10 8  As the Court
commented: "'[T]he canon against surplusage is strongest when an
interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same statutory
scheme. "'109
Utilizing this rule of statutory interpretation, we must assume that the
legislature would not enact a provision that was completely subsumed
under, or duplicative of, existing statutory language. Thus, if every case
involving a criminal offender who administers a drug to his victim
followed by rape would fall under the forcible compulsion subsection, then
the drugging provision would be made superfluous. To avoid rendering the
drugging subsection surplusage, one must conclude that the Ohio
legislature must have understood these two provisions as prohibiting
different evils, otherwise no need existed to include the drugging provision
in the rape statute when a force provision was already present in that
statute. The pattern of rape statutes including both drugged-rape and
forcible-rape provisions is quite common among other state sexual offense
provisions, strengthening the argument that these represent attempts to
punish separate types of harm. 1 10
A second problem with a court reading the forcible compulsion
provision as being broad enough to cover the factual circumstance of a
husband drugging his wife as a prelude to sexual assault is the wording of
the drugging provision. The anti-drugging subsection of the rape statute
specifies multiple methods of accomplishing the drugging:
For the purpose of preventing resistance, the offender substantially impairs the
other person's judgment or control by administering any drug, intoxicant, or
107 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(A)(1)(a) (West 2013).
"08 Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101
(2004)).
10 Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1178 (2013); see also Boise Cascade Corp. v. U.S.
Evntl. Prot. Agency, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Under accepted canons of statutory
interpretation, we must interpret statutes as a whole, giving effect to each word and making every effort
not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent,
meaningless or superfluous.").
1 0 For a fuller discussion of the phenomenon of rape by drugs, see Falk, supra note 21.
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controlled substance to the other person surreptitiously or by force, threat of
force, or deception. 111
One of the enumerated methods is "by force." Here it becomes even
clearer that the legislature viewed the drugged and forcible rape provisions
as prohibiting separate evils because using force to drug a victim is treated
differently than using force to physically subdue the victim. In this way,
the legislature appears to have explicitly rejected the argument made by the
Trigg court in equating these two applications of force.
Third, and perhaps more importantly in this context, the Ohio General
Assembly's deliberate decision to carve out an exception to the marital
exemption for forcible rape cases, but not for cases involving rape
accomplished by the administration of an intoxicating substance to the
victim (by force, threat, stealth, or deception), weighs strongly against
ignoring this legislative distinction and subsuming drugged rape under the
forcible rape provision. The plain language of the rape statute embodies a
legislative intent to treat these two methods of accomplishing rape
differently in terms of the marital exemption. Thus, a court would be
defeating this legislative judgment by equating them for purposes of the
immunity. In other words, if every type of rape could be reclassified as
"forcible rape" by asserting that drugging the victim constituted force or
that the force necessary for completing the sexual assault itself was
sufficient, then the legislature's judgment in only removing the marital
exemption for forcible rape would be defeated. 112 If the legislative intent
in enacting these separate exceptions is to be respected and effectuated by
courts interpreting the statute, then it is necessary to treat drugged and
forcible rape cases differently in terms of the marital immunity.
Finally, we must also consider another canon of statutory construction
specifically applicable to criminal statutes: the rule of lenity or the doctrine
of strict construction of statutes. 113 The rule of lenity provides that if a
criminal statute is ambiguous, then that ambiguity must be resolved on the
side of the criminal defendant. According to the Supreme Court,
"ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in
favor of lenity." 114 The importance of this canon of statutory construction
is underscored by the fact that Ohio has statutorily enacted it: "Except as
otherwise provided in division (C) or (D) of this section, sections of the
Revised Code defining offenses or penalties shall be strictly construed
" 1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a) (West 2013) (emphasis added).
112 Of course, I do not agree that these types of rape should be treated differently in terms of the
marital immunity, but the solution should be for the legislature to amend the rape law not for courts to
disregard plain legislative intent.
113 According to Joshua Dressier, "when a criminal statute is subject to conflicting reasonable
interpretations, the statute (including sentencing provisions thereto) should be interpreted in favor of the
defendant." UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 35, at 47.
114 Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
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against the state, and liberally construed in favor of the accused."' '15 The
rule was designed to encourage the legislature to be clearer about what
constitutes criminal conduct, rather than leaving that question to the
courts. 116 As Joshua Dressler notes, the rule of lenity "support[s] the
principle of legality by preventing a court from inadvertently enlarging the
scope of a criminal statute through its interpretive powers."' 117 Thus, if it is
ambiguous whether a person who drugs and sexually assaults his wife
would fit under the forcible rape provision because of the existence of a
separate drugging subsection specifically covering that behavior, then the
court would be required to find the provision inapplicable under the rule of
strict construction. The criminal defendant should be given the benefit of
doubt based on the ambiguity in the statute. Thus, the principle of lenity
weighs against expanding the coverage of the forcible rape provision to
include offenders who drug and then rape their victims.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the problem of the marital immunity
barring prosecution of husbands who drug and sexually assault their wives
cannot be solved by trying to subsume this behavior under the forcible
compulsion subsection of the rape statute. Even if it could be solved by
doing so, other types of rape - sexual penetration of a person who is
mentally or physically incapacitated - and other sexual offenses like sexual
battery would still fall outside the realm of punishment. The solution must
come in terms of legislative enactment rather than judicial expansion of the
scope of existing statutory provisions. 118
V. AN INDEFENSIBLE No-MAN'S LAND: A CRITIQUE OF OHIO'S PARTIAL
LEGISLATIVE ABOLITION OF THE MARITAL EXEMPTION
More than 1 in every 7 women who have ever been married have been
raped in marriage! 119
"I believed my husband loved and respected me and would have protected me
from harm ..... Instead he violated and betrayed my trust (and) treated my
body with total disregard and contempt." 120
i OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.04(A) (West 2013).
116 UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 35, at 47.
117 id.
"' In Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797 (1993), the Court of Appeals of Maryland has to decide whether
to uphold Maryland's strict liability statutory rape law. In deciding to do so, the court wrote:
"Maryland's second degree rape statute is by nature a creature of legislation. Any new provision
introducing an element of men rea * * * should properly result from an act of the Legislature itself,
rather than judicial fiat." Id. at 805 (emphasis in original).
l19 DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1990).
120 Man Rapes Drugged Wife, COURIER MAIL, Aug. 2, 2001, at 5, available at 2001 WLNR
5640141.
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Beginning more than forty years ago in 1975 and most recently in
1986,121 the Ohio legislature has lifted the marital immunity for certain
categories of spouses (e.g., those who are legally separated, getting
divorced, living separate and apart, or forcibly violated), but not for other
spouses (e.g., those who are drugged then raped or those who are
substantially incapacitated and incapable of consenting). This statutory
scheme defies logic in terms of both the historical and modern legal and
public policy justifications for the exemption, undervalues the quantum of
harm experienced by victims of these offenses, violates the prevailing legal
norms in the treatment of women, and defies the values of statutory clarity
and comprehensibility in criminal statutes. The partial lifting of the marital
immunity has created an indefensible no-man's land, uncomfortably
suspended between the traditional rule and the strong modern trend toward
complete abolition.
The reasons that the marital immunity should be abolished in a
prosecution for forcible rape apply with equal or greater force to other
types of rape and to other sexual offense categories. The grave injustice of
failing to protect women who are married to the same extent as women
who are not married exists whether the rape is accomplished by forcible
compulsion or by drugging. As a factual matter, men who batter women
are not limited to using their fists, but also render their victims unconscious
by drugging or other means. 12 2  To allow prosecution only in cases
involving physical force privileges certain battering conduct, based on little
more than the fortuitous choice of criminal means. Finally, a set of
criminal statutes so full of exemptions and exceptions that it rivals the
complexity of the Internal Revenue Code should be replaced by simple and
clear legislation that provides justice to victims of these horrendous crimes
and puts potential offenders on notice of the criminal nature of their
conduct.
A. The Traditional Legal and Policy Justifications.for the Marital
Exemption Are Outmoded and Untenable
"Rape entered the law through the back door, as it were, as a property
crime of man against man. Woman, of course, was viewed as the
property.' 123
121 In 1975, the Ohio General Assembly altered the definition of spouse. In 1985, it added the
"living separate and apart" language to the rape statute. In 1986, it eliminated the marital exemption for
forcible rape. In 1990, it altered the definition of spouse in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (L) (2) &
(3), such that the word "alimony" was replaced by "legal separation." See supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
122 See Marital Immunity, suprd note 2, at 1506.
123 SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 18 (Simon and Schuster 1975). See also Alexandra
Wald, What's Rightfully Ours: Toward a Property Theory of Rape, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 459,
462-63 n.14 (1997).
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By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at
least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose
wing, protection and cover, she performs everything .... 124
Three hundred years ago, Matthew Hale published an extra-judicial
statement about the relationship between marriage and the crime of rape
that has continued to affect the prosecution of modern rape cases into 21 st
century America: "[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by
himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and
contract the wife hath given herself in this kind unto her husband, which
she cannot retract. '' 125  Another English jurist, William Blackstone
contributed this conceptualization of the relationship between husbands and
wives: "This doctrine contends that 'the husband and wife are one person
in law,' with the 'legal existence of the woman ... suspended during the
marriage."'' 126
Over the ensuing centuries, legal commentators have derived four
related rationales for the marital exemption from these statements by Hale
and Blackstone, namely that upon marriage: (1) the woman became the
.hattel or property of her husband, 127 (2) the woman and man became one
legal entity - the man, 128 (3) a contract existed between the couple such
124 See Siegel, supra note 37 ("Essentially, husband and wife were one flesh; but the man was the
owner of that flesh."). See also Lisa R. Eskow, The Ultimate Weapon? Demythologizing Spousal Rape
and Reconceptualizing its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REv. 677, 679-84 (1996) (quoting Lawrence
Freidman).
125 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
629 (2003) (originally published in 1736). Hasday points out that the struggle to do away with the
marital exemption began in the I 800s:
Scholars have frequently assumed that marital rape was a private concern that nineteenth-
century feminists feared discussing in any public or systematic way. But the historical
record makes clear that these advocates not only publicly demanded the right to sexual self-
possession in marriage, they pressed the issue constantly, at length, and in plain language.
Hasday, Consent, supra note 22, at 1378-79.
126 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
127 Emily R. Brown, Changing the Marital Rape Exemption: I Am Chattel(?!); Hear Me Roar, 18
Am. J. Trial Advoc. 658 (1995); see also Waggoner, supra note 84 at 552-54; R v. R [1991] 2 All ER
257 (discussing the notion that the woman gave her person or body to her husband upon marriage);
Susan MCoin, Law and Sex Status: Implementing the Concept of Sexual Property, 19 Women's Rts. L.
Rep. 237, 243 (1998).
128 Siegel, supra note 37, at 357
In 1765, Blackstone stated "[b]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that
is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at
least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing,
protection and cover, she performs everything .... This became known as the marital
unities doctrine, which provided that a woman could not own property, make contracts, or
take part in litigation. This doctrine made the rape of a woman by her husband a legal
impossibility since a man could not rape himself.
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that the wife could not deny her husband any form of sexual activity, 129 and
(4) the woman irrevocably consented to all types of sexual activity. 130 In
the modern era, courts, 131 commentators, 132 and legislators have reacted to
these justifications for the marital exemption with understandable derision.
Wayne LaFave simply states: "None of the historical justifications for the
marital rape exemption have any validity today."' 133 As John F. Decker and
Peter G. Baroni, note in their recent survey of rape law:
The exemption is rooted in a centuries-old extrajudicial statement and has
persisted in the common law tradition ever since. The cases that have dealt
with the marital exemption at length have exposed it as irrational and
ungrounded, and have provided a blueprint for eliminating the marital
exemption altogether. 134
It is now universally agreed that women are not the property of their
husbands and that women have a separate legal existence from their
husbands. 135  In an era when divorce rates are about 50 per cent, 136 the
notion of an irrevocable contract between husband and wife may be
similarly disputed. 137 Finally, rape law has evolved to the extent of
recognizing that consent may be withdrawn at any time up to sexual
1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *430 (footnote omitted).
129 See Eskow, supra note 124, at 679-84 (discussing contract theory).
130 See Jonathan Witmer-Rich, It's Good to be Autonomous: Prospective Consent, Retrospective
Consent, and the Foundation of Consent in the Criminal Law, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 1, 12 (2011)
(discussing the notion of irrevocable prospective consent via the marital exemption); R[1991] 2 All ER
257 (English case eliminating marital exemption, discussing the notion of consent, and concluding "It
can never have been other than a fiction, and fiction is a poor basis for the criminal law.").
131 People v. Destefano, 121 Misc. 2d 113, 120 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1983); see also People v. Liberta, 485
N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984) (discussing consent, property, and no separate legal existence arguments).
132 See e.g., UNDERSTANDING CRIMtNAL LAW, supra note 35, at 587-89; WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW 923 (5th ed. 2010).
133 LAFAVE, supra note 132, at 923.
134 John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, "No" Still Means "Yes ": The Failure of the "Non-Consent"
Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081,
1166 (2011).
135 See LAFAVE, supra note 132, at 923; see also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997)
(discussing the elimination of coverture - the legal doctrine whereby the rights of a married woman
were subsumed under those of her husband).
136 See Divorce Rate (Most Recent) By Country, NATIONMASTER, available at
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/peo div rat-people-divorce-rate (2011). The current divorce rate
in the United States is nearly 50 percent, the highest rate amongst countries world-wide. Id.
137 See Witmer-Rich, supra note 130, at 12 (noting that all jurisdictions have dropped the irrevocable
consent argument even if they have retained the marital exemption). He also finds: "The most recent
American case to affirm an acquittal or reverse a conviction for rape or sexual assault based on the
irrevocable consent rational is from 1944. State v. Ward, 28 S.E.2d 785, 787 *S.C. 1944)." Id.
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penetration, and even post-penetration, 138 rendering any notion of long-
term, irrevocable consent as simply untenable. 139
Turning to Ohio law, reconsider the comments attached to the pattern
Ohio Jury Instructions for forcible rape:
The Committee believes that with the enactment of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), forcible
sexual conduct with a spouse is rape. The common law (and statutory)
defenses of implied consent and "the wife is a man's chattel" no longer
exist. 140
On its face, the logic of this comment is unassailable. The problem is
that the repudiation of these ancient justifications does not go far enough in
Ohio. Why is it only limited to cases involving forcible rape, when it
should be applied much more broadly to encompass the other types of rape
as well as the other sexual offenses? Could one seriously contend that
women do not impliedly consent to forcible rape by their husbands, but
they do impliedly consent to being drugged and then raped by their
husbands? Similarly, could one argue the notion that "the wife is a man's
chattel" does not apply in the circumstance when a husband forcibly rapes
his wife, but that it does apply in the situation when he uses drugs to
subdue her so she cannot express lack of consent? To ask these questions
is to answer them.
Despite the broad-reaching language of the comment to the jury
instructions, Ohio's sexual offenses continue to protect those who engage
in sexual assaults that cannot be classified as "forcible," such as when the
assailant subdues his marital partner by drugging her or when he takes
advantage of a marital partner with significant mental or physical
impairments. Similarly, the repudiation of the marital unities theory and
the marriage contract theory cannot be confined to a partial lifting of the
marital exemption. These justifications do not furnish support for any type
of marital immunity.
B. Modern Legal and Policy Justifications Cannot Support the
Marital Exemption
"All of the prominent reasons used to justify marital rape rules, such as
privacy and family harmony, fear of vindictive complaints, and problems
of proof, have fared poorly in the face of equal protection and statutory
challenges."' 14 1
138 See, e.g., Katlyn Hood, State v. Baby: A Woman May Withdraw Consent for Sexual Intercourse
After Penetration, and Continuation of Sexual Intercourse after Withdrawal of Consent through Force
or Threat of Force Constitutes Rape, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 114 (2008); Amy McLellan, Post-Penetration
Rape-Increasing the Penalty, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 779 (1991).
139 Witmer-Rich, supra note 130, at 8-12.
140 2-CR 507 OI 507.02(A)(1).
141 Nourse, supra note 104, at 965.
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The modem defenders of the marital rape exemption, in contrast, submerge
and deny the harm that the rule causes women. This has been good strategy for
a reason. It is much more difficult to justify the harm that marital rape inflicts
upon wives, and explain the absence of legal remediation, in a nation now
formally committed to women's legal equality and the undoing of women's
subjection at common law. 1 4 2
A second, more modem set of rationales or justifications for the marital
exemption have taken the place of the traditional or historical ones. These
rationales are as flawed as the ones they replaced. The most common
modern justifications are: (1) marital unity should be protected against the
intrusion of the state, (2) greater proof problems will arise with respect to
rape in marriage, (3) women may lie about the fact of rape within
marriage, 143 and (4) martial rape is not as serious an offense as other forms
of sexual assault. 144 None of these rationales have held up on closer
scrutiny; they have been sharply disputed by commentators, researchers,
and courts. 145
Perhaps the most important modem justification of the marital
exemption is that rape within marriage is less serious, damaging, or
harmful than other forms of sexual violation - after all, the parties are
married to each other and the woman has presumably had sexual
intercourse with her husband on numerous occasions. 1 46 Joshua Dressler
explains: "When intercourse is coerced on a given occasion in the marital
relationship, the argument proceeds, the wife's autonomy is less seriously
violated than if the perpetrator were a stranger or someone with whom the
victim had not indicated a general willingness to have sexual relations." '147
142 Hasday, Consent, supra note 22, at 1504.
143 Dressler notes: "Beyond this, it is odd at best for the law to take sides with a wrongdoer against
his victim on the unproven assumption that the victims, as a group, will behave improperly in civil
proceedings." UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 35, at 588.
144 LAFAVE, supra note 132, at 923-24 (discussing multiple modern justifications and
counterarguments); UNDERSTANDING CRIMtNAL LAW, supra note 35, at 587-89 (discussing protection
of marriage, protection of husband in divorce proceedings, and less serious harm rationales).
145 See Siegel, supra note 37; UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 35, at 587-89; LAFAVE,
supra note 132, at 923; People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984) (discussing and dismissing four
more modern rationales for the marital exemption).
146 Susan Estrich disputed the notion that "real" rape is only when the parties are strangers to one
another, when force and violence is manifest, and when physical injuries are sustained by the victim.
SuSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM VICTIMIZES WOMEN WHO SAY No (1987). See
also Emily J. Sack, Is Domestic Violence a Crime? Intimate Partner Rape as Allegory, 24 ST. JOHN'S
J. L. COMM. 535 (2010) ("Just as marital rape is not truly considered 'real' rape. Perhaps we do not
think that domestic violence deserves to be considered a 'real' crime.").
147 UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 35, at 588. See also Marital Immunity, supra note
2, at 1543 ("a number of scholars have argued that spousal sexual offenses in general are not harmful
enough for the justice system to criminalize.") In February 2015, a Utah lawmaker argued that sex with
an unconscious wife is less criminal than sex with an unconscious first date. Juliet Lapidos, In Utah,
Wondering What Rape Really Is, N.Y.TIMES (Feb, 4, 2015),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/in-utah-wondering-what-rape-really-is/?_r-.
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Empirical data support the opposite conclusion. 148 The victims of
marital rape do experience multiple physical, psychological, and emotional
harms. 149  The bodily consequences of victimization include physical
injuries, unwanted pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, and exposure
to HIV and AIDS. 15 ° As one commentator states:
One of the biggest myths about marital rape is that "it's no big deal" - that
the woman says she's tired and wants to go to bed, and the husband
misunderstands. That's not reality. A rape or sexual assault is a horrifying
experience that is used as a means to degrade, humiliate and control. There is
no way the crime can be rationalized or excused whether it happened between
strangers or intimate partners. 151
In fact, compelling evidence supports the conclusion that marital rape is
more harmful than rape outside of marriage.
Research indicates that wife rape victims are more likely to be raped
multiple times compared with stranger and acquaintance rape victims. In
research with wife rape victims, most report being raped more than once,
with at least 1/3 of the women reporting being raped more than 20 times
over the course of their relationship (citations omitted). Women who
experience wife rape suffer long lasting physical and psychological injuries
as severe or more severe than stranger rape victims. 152
Similarly, Jill Elaine Hasday reports: "[T]he best available empirical
studies report that marital rape is both widespread and extremely damaging,
frequently causing even more trauma than rape outside of marriage." 153
The psychological consequences of rape can be debilitating: "Despite
commonly held views, the psychological reactions of victims of intimate
partner rape can be far more severe than the response of those who have
148 The Liberta court noted:
"Moreover, there is no evidence to support the argument that marital rape has less severe consequences
than other rape. On the contrary, numerous studies have shown that marital rape is frequently quite
violent and generally has more severe, traumatic effects on the victim than other rape." People v.
Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 575 (N.Y. 1984) (emphasis in the original) (citations omitted).
149 Dressier notes that rape causes different harms than those resulting from assault and battery.
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 35, at 588; Leslie Bender, Teaching Torts as If Gender
Matters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 115, 148-50 (1994)_(arguing that tort law
undervalues emotional as opposed to physical security and property claims, which harms women).
150 Man Rapes Drugged Wife, COURIER MAIL, Aug. 2,2001, at 5, available at 2001 WLNR 5640141
(Mrs. Hoibl experienced a host of gynecological problems as a result of her husband's repeated rape of
her while she was drugged).
151 Rhoda, supra note 2. In the same article about the Utah lawmaker resurrecting notions of less
harm in marital rape scenarios, a representative of a local rape crisis center said, "Instead of dicing and
parsing and saying, 'Well, what about a wife if she's asleep?' just look at what is happening and the
prevalence of sexual assault in our world .... It's a tool of power. That might be why they're parsing.
They don't want to look at what is going on around them." Lapidos, supra note 147.
152 Patricia Mahoney, The Wife Rape Fact Sheet, https://mainweb-
v.musc.edu/vawprevention/research/wiferape.shtml.
153 Hasday, Protecting Them from Themselves, supra note 71, at 1471 (footnotes omitted).
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suffered rape by a stranger, because in addition to all the other horrors,
there is the sense of betrayal and destruction of any trust that once
existed." 154 Anderson points out: "[C]ontrary to popular belief, wife rape
tends to be more violent and psychologically damaging than stranger
rape. ' 155  The sense of betrayal suffered by marital partners is
considerable. 156
Research also confirms that sexual assault in marriage may be a
precursor to homicide, 157 and that sexual assault within marriage must be
understood as simply one category of spousal abuse and battering. Rather
than viewing rape as a single isolated event in a marriage, sexual assault is
part of the pattern of abuse that occurs in battering relationships. 158
Every day, three women in the U.S. are murdered by their current or former
husbands or boyfriends, and a leading indicator of their deaths is sexual
assault. David Adams, in his book "Why Do They Kill?" found that three-
quarters of women he interviewed who survived nearly fatal attacks said their
abusive partner had raped them.
159
Thus, the legal argument or public policy rationale that rape or other
sexual assaults are less serious offenses when they occur in marriage rather
than outside of it cannot be supported by either theory or fact.
C. Drawing the Line at Force or Violence Privileges Other Forms of
Coercion
The marital rape exemption might also be understood as part of a larger
trend in the history of rape law to keep the crime of rape narrow. The
effect of narrowing the scope of rape law is to privilege a host of morally
154 Sack, supra note 146, at 535.
155 Marital Immunity, supra note 2, at 1475.
156 Many of the victims discussed in the first section of this article expressed their deep sense of
betrayal in being sexually assaulted by their spouses. See, e.g., Man Rapes Drugged Wife, COURIER
MAIL, Aug. 2, 2001, at 5, available at 2001 WLNR 5640141.
157 Sack, supra note 146, at 548 ("There is also evidence that batterers who rape their partners may
be among the most dangerous perpetrators of domestic violence.... And victims of domestic violence
who are also the victims of intimate partner rape are subject to more serious physical abuse and a
greater risk of homicide.").
158 According to Hasday, "Many women's experiences combine marital rape and wife beating,
doubly undercutting the proposition that the exemption is protecting marriages that are otherwise
peaceful, harmonious, and mutually supportive." Hasday, Consent, supra note 22, at 1497. See also
Sack, supra note 146; Jessica Klarfeld, A Striking Disconnect: Marital Rape Law's Failure to Keep Up
with Domestic Violence Law, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1819 (2011).
159 Rhoda, supra note 2. Recall the Boren case from the beginning of this article. John Chapman,
Policeman Husband that Filmed Himself Raping His Unconscious Wife Slaughters Family, DAILY AND
SUNDAY ExPREss (July 10, 2014), http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/487866/Rapist-Police-
Husband-Rape-Film-Drugged-Family-Death-Murder-Manslaughter-Shot-Shooting; Police: Officer Who
Killed Family had Raped Wife, YAHOO (July 7, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/police-officer-killed-
family-had-raped-wife-23580526 1 .html.
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blameworthy and socially intolerable behaviors. In this context it is
impossible to ignore the feminist critique of the history of rape law, 160
namely that it privileges one gender at the expense of the other and that the
legal rules are "'boys' rules' applied to a boys' fight."' 161
Despite the gender-neutral language in most modern rape or sexual
assault statutes, the vast majority of victims are women 162 and the vast
majority of perpetrators are men. 163  Thus, maintaining the marital
immunity and lifting the exemption only in a very narrow set of
circumstances actually privileges men to sexually exploit women. As
Dorothy Roberts cogently argues in a slightly different context:
If rape is violence as the law defines it (weapons, bruises, blood), then what
most men do when they disregard women's sexual autonomy is not rape. If
rape is committed only by violent men, then very few men are rapists. By
defining most male sexual conduct as nonviolent, even when it is coercive, it
has been possible to exempt a multitude of attacks on women's autonomy from
criminal punishment, or even critical scrutiny. The category of violence, far
from punishing all sexual assaults, actually privileges most of them. 
164
Similarly, a legal regime that abolishes the marital immunity when it
comes to forcible rape, but continues to permit the immunity when it comes
to rape of a drugged or substantially impaired victim perpetuates the
privilege enjoyed by husbands to sexually assault their wives in these latter
contexts.
160 Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L. J. 1087, 1118 (1986)_("Most of the time, a criminal law that
reflects male views and male standards imposes its judgment on men who have injured other men....
In rape, the male standard defines a crime committed against women, and male standards are used not
only to judge men, but also to judge the conduct of women victims."). " [If] there is one area of social
behavior where sexism is entrenched in law - one realm where traditional male prerogatives are most
protected, male power most jealously preserved, and female power most jealously limited - it is in the
area of sex itself, even forced sex." Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 813, 814-15 (1991).
161 Id.
162 Michael Planty, et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Female Victims of Sexual Violence, 1994-
2010, March 2013, "From 1995 to 2010, approximately 9% of all rape or sexual assault victimizations
recorded in the NCVS [National Crime Victimization Survey] involved male victims []." (figure
omitted).
163 In 2011, there were 11,934 male arrests and 135 female arrests for rape. The FBI Uniform Crime
Reports for 2011, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-
the-u.s/201 1/crime-in-the-u.s.-201 1/tables/table-33A.
164 Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 359, 362-63
(1993). See also CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 649 (1979)
(arguing the legal definition of rape corresponds to "the level of acceptable force starting just above the
level set by what is seen as normal male sexual behavior, rather than at the victim's, or women's, point
of violation."). Roberts also points out: "I fear as much that disconnecting all seemingly nonviolent
sexual coercion from sex accompanied by physical violence will obscure the common nature of both."
Roberts, supra, at 381. Susan Estrich concurs: "The 'rape as violence' approach may strengthen the
case for punishing violently coerced sex, but it may do so at the cost of obscuring the case for punishing
forced sex in the absence of conventional violence, the usual pattern in the simple rape." Estrich, supra
note 160, at 1150.
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The logic of alleviating the marital exemption for forcible rape as
compared to the other forms of rape is not unassailable. 165 To return to the
example at the beginning of this article - when a husband drugs and then
sexually assaults his wife - failure to criminalize this behavior seems
indefensible when one considers the type of victim involved in these cases.
Spouses who have been drugged or who lack the mental or physical
capacity to consent to sexual conduct are deserving of more, not less,
protection from the criminal justice system because they are the most
vulnerable victims. As one commentator states with respect to similar
provisions in Alaska166 and Rhode Island: 167 "The logic of this approach is
difficult to follow, since it denies state protection to those women least
capable of defending themselves."' 168
Similarly, an argument that no real harm befalls victims who are
drugged or incapacitated is deeply flawed. Anderson comments: "As a
practical matter, the argument that incapacitated and unconscious rape are
not harmful reveals ignorance of the perils of sexual penetration for a
woman. A man who penetrates a woman when she is unconscious denies
her the power to negotiate the use of contraceptives and other protection to
prevent pregnancy and disease." 169 Anderson also discusses the physical
consequences for a women who is subjected to sexual exploitation when
she is in an unconscious state. 17° Thus, taken as a whole, these provisions
have no internal logic or coherence, but rather appear to be arbitrary
decisions by lawmakers.
A second major problem with statutorily enshrining the marital
exemption to rape and other sexual offenses in Ohio is that no other
criminal offenses have such an exemption. If the scenarios discussed at the
beginning of this article had occurred in Ohio, the husband could not be
prosecuted for any sexual offense, but he might face prosecution for
another type of crime, such as assault, felonious assault, or corrupting
another with drugs because these latter offenses do not contain a marital
exemption. 171 This means the sexual offenses are treated differently from
all other crimes in Ohio. The "special treatment" of the sexual offenses
161 Sack, supra note 146, at 538.
166 See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (2014).
167 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2 (2014) ("A person is guilty of first degree sexual assault if he
or she engages in sexual penetration with another person, and if any of the following circumstances
exist: (1) The accused, not being the spouse, knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally
incapacitated, mentally disabled, or physically helpless.").
168 Sitton, supra note 77, at 279. The author continues: "Statutory rape is another offense from which
allowance states frequently exempt spouses." Id. at 280. This reflects the case in Ohio.
169 Marital Immunity, supra note 2, at 1508. For a first-hand account of the harm of drugged rape,
see Andrea Dworkin, The Day I was Drugged and Raped, THE NEW STATESMAN (June 5, 2000, 1:00
PM), http://www.newstatesman.com/node/137791 ("I have been tortured and this drug-rape runs
through it, a river of horror. I'm feeling perpetual terror, ... I'm ready to die.").
170 Marital Immunity, supra note 2, at 1508.
171 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § § 2903.11, 2903.13, 2925.02 (West 2013), respectively.
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through the imposition of the marital immunity represents a significant
departure from the overall background rule that the criminal law should
apply to all persons equally without exception.
D. The Marital Rape Exemption Violates Equal Protection of the
Laws
Just as a factual matter, husbands experience the marital rape exemption
by enjoying immunity from prosecution. Wives experience the marital rape
exemption as the person who does not receive the protection of the criminal
law for acts that would otherwise be considered serious crimes. 172
That these inequalities remain on the statute books should be surprising, not
only because many believe that the marital rape exemption has been banished,
but also because marital rape differentials have been widely held to be
unconstitutional. All of the prominent reasons used to justify marital rape
rules,.. have fared poorly in the face of equal protection and statutory
challenges. 173
Rape is a sex-based crime, the only crime in which men are the offenders and
women the victims. 174
Some courts have held175 and commentators have argued 176 that
continuation of the marital immunity to rape law is a violation of state and
federal constitutional law, more specifically the Equal Protection
provisions. 177 Legal scholar Robin West comments "[t]he marital rape
exemption denies married women protection against violent crime solely
on the basis of gender and marital status. What possibly could be less
rational than a statute that criminalizes sexual assault, and punishes it
severely, unless the victim and assailant are married." 178
Thus, the equal protection inquiry is as follows: if sexual offenses are
designed to protect the sexual autonomy and physical integrity of Ohio
residents, then why should married individuals receive only part of the
172 Hasday, Consent, supra note 22, at 1496.
173 Nourse, supra note 104, at 965 (footnote omitted).
174 Morrision Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape
Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1059 (1991).
175 See LAFAVE, supra note 132, at 924 for a list of state courts that have found the marital
exemption unconstitutional.
176 See Robin L. West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 45 (1990). See also Theresa Fus, Criminalizing Marital Rape: A
Comparison of Judicial and Legislative Approaches, 39 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 481 (2006) (advocating
the use of equal protection analysis); Lawrence G. Sager, Congress's Authority to Enact the Violence
against Women Act: One More Pass at the Missing Argument, 121 Yale L.J. Online (April 17, 2012),
http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/forum/congresss-authority-to-enact-the-violence-against-women-act-
one-more-pass-at-the-missing-argument (arguing that women have been oppressed throughout history).
177 West, supra note 176, at 45; see also FRED STREBEIGH, EQUAL: WOMEN RESHAPE AMERICAN
LAW 328-32 (2009) (discussing West's article).
178 id.
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protections that the Ohio legislature designed for all other residents?
Although these arguments are typically addressed to the courts in suits
challenging legislative enactments as violating constitutional protections,
legislators also have a duty to evaluate the potential impact of a criminal
statute on constitutional rights. 179
A second type of equal protection argument might be made based on
the fact that the sexual offenses are the only group of criminal offenses in
Ohio that use the marital exemption to exclude certain classes of
individuals (marital partners) from prosecution. If it is true that the vast
majority of victims of sexual offenses (at least outside the prison context)
are women and the vast majority of the perpetrators are men, then a rule
that provides for special protection for male perpetrators is suspect. And
the question naturally follows - why should males be protected from
charges of rape or other forms of sexual assault when they are not protected
in other criminal contexts such as murder, assault, or robbery?
E. Marital Rape as a Human Rights Violation
In nearly every country in the world, the most dangerous place for women is
the home. While men find refuge there, for millions of women, the home is a
prison and a torture chamber. The torture comes at the hands of men who
claim to love them. 180
Women worldwide ages 15 through 44 are more likely to die or be maimed
because of male violence than because of cancer, malaria, war and traffic
accidents combined. 181
In 1991, the English House of Lords decided R. v. R., a case
challenging the continued vitality of the marital exemption by holding that
the immunity was no longer valid. 18 2 The husband in R. sought an appeal
to the European Court of Human Rights "arguing that to convict him would
amount to an ex post facto conviction in violation of Article 7 of the
European Convention on Human Rights." 8 3 Before that appeal was heard,
Parliament codified the elimination of the marital immunity. 184 In 1995,
the European Court of Human Rights held there was no violation of the
Human Rights Convention because the decision by the House of Lords was
an incremental and reasonably foreseeable interpretation of the English
179 LAFAVE, supra note 132, at 924 ("Sometimes this [reform] has been accomplished by state courts
finding their marital exemption provisions unconstitutional, but more often it has come about as a result
of legislative action.").
180 Judith Armatta, Getting Beyond the Law's Complicity in Intimate Violence against Women, 33
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 773, 775 (1997).
i'1 Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Is Delhi So Different From Steubenville?, NY TIMES (Jan. 13,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/opinion/sunday/is-delhi-so-different-from-
steubenville.html.
112 R. v. R., [1992] 1 AC 599.
183 Fus, supra note 176, at 492.
184 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994 C.33 (Eng.).
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law. 185 In contrast, some authors have contended that recognition of a
marital immunity to rape and other sexual offenses should constitute a
human rights violation. 186
F. Ohio's Marital Exemption Scheme Defies the Prevailing Legal
Norms of Statutory Clarity and Comprehensibility in Criminal
Statutes
Punishment is sometimes spoken of as the purpose of the criminal law, but this
is quite erroneous. The purpose of the criminal law is to define socially
intolerable conduct, and to hold conduct within the limits which are reasonably
acceptable from the social point of view.... An incidental but very important
function of the criminal law is to teach the difference between right and
wrong. 187
Understanding precisely how this [marital exemption] works can often be a
rather complex process, rivaling the unraveling of tax code regulations.1
88
Ohio's marital exemption in its rape and sexual offense provisions with
its three discrete exceptions is a complicated and convoluted statutory
scheme that defies easy description or understanding. Due process and
public policy dictate that criminal statutes should be clear, rather than so
vague or ambiguous that the average person would struggle to understand
their meaning. 18 9 Dressier explains: "A corollary of the common law
legality principle - one that is constitutionally enforceable through the Due
Process Clause - is that a criminal statute must 'provide a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.'"19° The void for
185 Fus, supra note 176, at 516.
186 See Felice D. Gaer, Rape as a Form of Torture: The Experience of the Committee Against
Torture, 15 CUNY L. REV. 293 (2012). See also Diane Hickey, The As Yet Unfulfilled Promise and
Potential of European Union Human Rights Law, 30 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 647 (2009); Julie
Goldscheid, Domestic and Sexual Violence as Sex Discrimination: Comparing American and
International Approaches, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 355 (2006).
187 ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 5-6 (3rd ed. 1982) (emphasis added).
"In one of his most celebrated essays, Oliver Wendell Holmes explained that the law does not exist to
tell the good man what to do, but to tell the bad man what not to do." Susan Estrich, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
188 See Nourse, supra note 104, at 964:
How could the average citizen/advocate/reformer possibly untangle the Maryland statute?
Indeed, even for scholars of rape law, the time and effort to try to discover the precise
interconnections between the exemptions and their relationship to general nonspousal
statutes is relatively exhausting and largely unknown. It is within this complexity that the
norms of relationship live on and hold court, albeit silently. Id. at 967.
189 "The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that an accused have had fair
warning at the time of his conduct that such conduct was made criminal by the State." People v.
Liberta, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207,219 (1984) (citingBouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347).
190 UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 35, at 43 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553
U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).
No. 3/4]
WOMEN'S RIGHTS LA W REPORTER
vagueness doctrine applies to criminal statutes because we seek to provide
the population with fair notice of what conduct is legally permissible and
what conduct crosses the line into criminal behavior. 191  If criminal
provisions fail to reach a minimal level of clarity, then they must be set
aside. In addition to informing the public of the parameters of the criminal
law, the void for vagueness doctrine operates to circumscribe the discretion
of police and prosecutors in applying and enforcing the law. 19 2 Thus, the
virtues of statutory clarity and comprehensibility should not be
underestimated when it comes to crafting criminal statutes; laws that are
difficult to fathom, obtuse, and esoteric should be avoided.
In writing about Maryland's rape statute and its marital exemption, one
author likens the understanding of the state's marital immunity to "the
unraveling of tax code regulations."' 193 Similarly, Ohio's piece-meal lifting
of the exemption makes it very difficult to determine what degree of the
marital exemption applies within the crime of rape as well as with respect
to the other three sexual offenses. The tripartite lifting of the marital
exemption requires close statutory analysis to determine the contours of
"legal" conduct. Criminal statutes should clearly inform the public - as
well as police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys - what constitutes an
offense and what behavior falls within the purview of legal sanction.
Failure to do so raises constitutional notice and due process issues. 194
In addition to the due process and notice arguments for statutory clarity,
the rule of lenity or doctrine of strict construction provides that any
191 Id.
192 UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 35, at 43.
193 Nourse, supra note 104, at 964 gives this example:
The bottom line is that, in Maryland, if you accomplish sexual intercourse by threatening to
kill your wife, you have not committed first-degree rape, but you have if you similarly
threaten a stranger. Indeed, because of the way rape is defined, you can threaten to kidnap
your wife or bring along a few others to "aid and abet" sexual intercourse, and this conduct
could not be prosecuted as first-degree rape, although it would be if the victim were a
stranger. Maryland, unfortunately, is not the only state in which this kind of complex
"partial repeal" governs marital rape. Id. See MD CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-318 (West
2014) (formerly MD CODE Art. 27 § 464D) for the spousal defense statute.
194 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,108 (1972).
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to
steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to policeman, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis,
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Id.
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ambiguity in a criminal statute must be resolved in favor of the accused. 195
As the United States Supreme Court directed:
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the
law before he murders or steals [or rapes], it is reasonable that a fair warning
should be given to the world in language that the common world will
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make
the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear. 1 9 6
Thus, it is critical that the criminal law provide a reasonable person fair
notice of what is prohibited conduct. Failure to do so inheres to the benefit
of the putative defendant.
Victoria Nourse suggests a darker motive may exist for legislative
ambiguity: "That old, discarded norms might survive post-reform is not
only predictable because legislatures trade in deliberate ambiguity, but also
because ambiguity nurtures overtly rejected norms. Ambiguity works to
hide discarded or unlikely norms by making it difficult to obtain the
information about precisely what the norm is. '"197 If Nourse is correct, the
ambiguity inherent in Ohio's treatment of the marital exemption in its rape
and other sexual offenses actually provides a mechanism for perpetuating
those norms. The ambiguity helps to retain the marital immunity and
reinforce the characterization of some married women as underserving of
the law's protection. Based on the foregoing critiques, the next part offers
suggestions for statutory reform.
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR STATUTORY REFORM: ABOLISHING THE MARITAL
EXEMPTION FROM OHIO'S RAPE AND OTHER SEXUAL OFFENSE
PROVISIONS
We take the view that the time has now arrived when the law should
declare that a rapist remains a rapist subject to the criminal law,
irrespective of his relationship with his victim. 198
"[I]f a person is unconscious, sex with him or her 'is rape. Period. End
of story."' 199
To complete a reform begun more than 40 years ago and to solve the
problem posed by this article - criminalizing the drugging and subsequent
raping of one's spouse - the Ohio General Assembly should take three
195 Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) ("[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal
statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.").
196 McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
197 Nourse, supra note 104, at 960.
198 R[1991] 2 All ER 257.
199 Lapidos, supra note 147.
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interrelated steps to abolish the marital exemption from the state's rape and
sexual offense provisions."' ° First, the legislators should eliminate any
reference to "spouse" from the text of Ohio's sexual offenses. 20 1 Second, it
should enact new language explicitly stating that marriage, cohabitation, or
a previous sexual relationship between the perpetrator and victim is not
legally relevant to the questions of whether a sexual offense occurred, or
whether the victim consented, on the occasion in question. Third, the
legislature should request that the Ohio Judicial Conference 2 2 devise and
promulgate pattern jury instructions for sexual assault cases involving
marital partners. These instructions would be based on the newly enacted
language of the sexual offense provisions and inform juries that marriage,
cohabitation, or a prior sexual relationship has no bearing on criminal
liability or on the issue of consent.
A. Delete the Word "Spouse "from the Definitional Statute and the
Operative Provisions of Ohio's Sexual Offenses
The first and most important step that the Ohio General Assembly
should undertake in addressing the problem of the marital exemption is to
delete the word "spouse" from all the major sexual offense provisions20 3 as
well as the definitional statute preceding the operative statutes.20 4 This
simple step would abolish the marital exemption in its entirety and make
the existence of a marital relationship between the perpetrator and the
victim legally irrelevant. Ohio law would then provide no safe haven for
those who happen to be the "spouse" of the victim, bringing the law in line
with modern thinking about marriage, women's roles in marriage, and the
notion of what consent means within a marital relationship. It would
acknowledge that marital rape is as harmful and worthy of criminal
sanction as rape that occurs outside of marriage. It would eliminate any
constitutional equal protection argument by equalizing the treatment of
married and unmarried women. This change would also bring the sexual
200 The same recommendation applies to other state legislatures with similar types of marital rape
immunities still on their books.
201 See infra Part VIA. LAFAVE, supra note 132, at 924 (discussing the action by some legislatures
in "removing the words 'not his spouse.' 'to whom he is not married,' or 'unlawful' from an existing
rape statute.").
202 According to the statute creating the Ohio Judicial Conference, its purposes are "to study the co-
ordination of the work of the several courts in Ohio, To encourage uniformity in the application of the
law, rules, and practice throughout the state and within each division of the courts as an integral part of
the judicial system of the state; To promote an exchange of experience and suggestions respecting the
operation of the judicial; system, and To consider the business and problems pertaining to the
administration of justice and to make recommendations for its improvement." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
105.91 (West 2013).
203 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2013) (rape); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (West
2013) (sexual battery); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.05 (West 2013) (gross sexual imposition); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.06 (West 2013) (sexual imposition).
204 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (West 2013) (defining the various terms used throughout the
revised code).
[Vol. 36
Husbands Who Drug and Rape Their Wives
offenses in line with all other criminal offenses in the state, none of which
segregate those who are married for special treatment or exemption. 20 5 The
elimination of the word "spouse" would simplify and clarify the prevailing
legal rules so that putative perpetrators, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
judges, and juries would not have to parse the complex language of Ohio's
three-tiered marital immunity. Thus, it would be irrelevant to criminal
liability whether the marital partners were getting divorced, lived
separately, or continued to cohabit. Finally, this simple step would
complete a reform that the Ohio General Assembly began more than forty
years ago and would align Ohio with the majority of American jurisdictions
that have eliminated the marital exemption in its entirety. 20 6
B. Enact a Provision Making Marriage, Cohabitation, or a Prior
Sexual Relationship Between Perpetrator and Victim Legally
Irrelevant
In addition to deleting the word "spouse" from the text of the sexual
offenses, the Ohio General Assembly should enact a provision making
marriage, cohabitation, or a prior sexual relationship between the offender
and the victim legally irrelevant. While it appears that the first step should
resolve the entire issue, some legal commentators offer a cautionary note.
They contend that removing statutory language about spouses in the
operative provisions of the relevant sexual offenses may be insufficient to
abolish the marital exemption in practice. This is because some courts or
jurors may interpret the operative statute's silence as to marital status as
consistent with historical views on the marital exemption (that it is alive
and well) rather than its abolition.20 7
Consider one recent example of this phenomenon. In February, 2015, a
Utah lawmaker proposed removing the phrase "has not consented" from a
provision that made it sexual assault if "the victim has not consented and
the actor knows the victim is unconscious, unaware that the act is
occurring, or physically unable to resist. ' ' 208 The legislator's rationale for
removing the phrase was that the language provided a potential loophole
and was unnecessary because an unconscious victim cannot consent.20 9
However, a second Utah legislator was not so sure that this amendment was
a good idea. He argued, "[i]f an individual has sex with their [sic] wife
while she is unconscious, . . . a prosecutor could then charge that spouse
with rape, theoretically." That, he continued "makes sense in a first date
scenario, but to me, not where people have a history of years of sexual
205 See supra Part V.C.
206 Hasday, Protecting Them from Themselves, supra note 71.
207 Marital Immunity, supra note 2, at 1553.
20' Lapidos, supra note 147.
209 Id.
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activity."21 0 Other legislators noted that spousal rape is a very real and
serious problem and agreed that sexual intercourse with an unconscious
person is rape, pure and simple. 211 This example demonstrates that even
legislators may be confused about the parameters of criminal liability for
sexual assault, reading into a statute that is silent on the subject an
exclusion for marital partners that does not exist.
Thus, Ohio should preempt any potential future misunderstanding of
the scope of the state's sexual offenses by taking a second step: inserting
language into those provisions clarifying that a marital relationship
between the perpetrator and victim is not relevant to the question of
whether a sexual offense has been committed or whether the victim
consented to the sexual conduct or contact on the occasion in question.
This step would be similar to the language enacted in 1986 when Ohio
abolished the marital exemption in forcible rape cases: "It is not a defense
to a charge under division (A)(2) of this section that the offender and the
victim were married or were co-habiting at the time of the commission of
the offense." 212
Examples of this type of language are found in other states that have
eliminated the marital exemption. For instance, Colorado's statute
provides:
Any marital relationship, whether established statutorily, putatively, or by
common law, between an actor and a victim shall not be a defense to any
offense under this part 4 unless such a defense is specifically set forth in the
applicable statutory section by having the elements of the specifically exclude
a spouse.213
New Hampshire uses a slightly different approach: "An actor commits a
crime under this chapter even though the victim is the actor's legal
spouse."2 14  The statute in Wisconsin states: "A defendant shall not be
presumed to be incapable of violating this section because of marriage to
the complainant. 215  Thus, the safest course is to eliminate language
pertaining to spouses and also to insert an explicit provision stating that the
marital exemption to rape and other sexual offenses is abrogated.
Although salutary in making clear that silence does not denote
acceptance of the marital immunity, some of these provisions may not go
far enough. According to some legal commentators, 216 the marital
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G) (West 2013).
213 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 18-3-409 (West 2010).
214 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:5(6) (2010).
215 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(6) (West 2010).
216 Id. See also CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEX EQUALITY: RAPE LAW 870 (2001) ("In light of the
widespread social and legal reluctance to effectively address rape among familiars, the marital rape
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exemption is merely one incarnation of a larger problem systemic to rape
law - the privileging of perpetrators who have had prior sexual
relationships with their victims. 217  In other words, offenders who have
cohabiting relationships or even more causal sexual relationships with
victims may be able to exploit those prior relationships in arguing consent.
To be even more explicit about the elimination of the marital exemption
and to capture other types of non-marital sexual relationships, Professor
Michelle Anderson proposes the following statutory language:
A prior or subsequent sexual relationship between the defendant and the
complainant-in marriage, cohabitation, dating, or other circumstances-shall
not be a defense to a sexual offense and shall not affect the grading of a sexual
offense. The sole fact that the complainant consented to the same or different
acts with the defendant on other occasions shall not be a sufficient basis for
inferring consent on the instance in question. The mere existence of such a
sexual relationship shall not be a sufficient basis for the defendant to claim a
mistake of fact as to consent defense. 2 18
Only by explicitly directing the fact finder that such a prior relationship
between the offender and the victim is not legally relevant, Anderson
argues, will the inherent and unspoken bias created by that relationship be
overcome.
Three states and the federal government have laws that embrace
Anderson's perspective. California has a statute clarifying that a prior
relationship between the victim and defendant does not bear on the
question of consent:
In prosecutions under Section 261 [rape], 262 [spousal rape], 286 [sodomy],
288a [oral copulation], or 289 [penetration by foreign object], in which consent
is at issue, "consent shall be defined to mean positive cooperation in act or
attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The person must act freely and
voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction
involved.
exclusion can be seen as only the most formal expression of a tendency that extends across the design
and deep into the administration of the law of rape to make closeness a proxy for consent.").
2'7 Norwegian psychologist Christie discusses the ideal victim in a rape case-not knowing the
defendant is one of the characteristics. In other words, a pre-existing relationship between the
defendant and the victim damages a rape case. Hannah Brenner, Beyond Seduction: Lessons Learned
About Rape, Politics, and Power From Dominique Strauss-Kahn and Moshe Katsav, 20 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 225 (2013). The Model Penal Code made rape a less serious offense if the victim was a
voluntary social companion of the defendant-one of its most controversial provisions. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.1(1) (1962); Deborah Denno, Commentary Symposium: Model Penal Code Second: Good
or Bad Idea?: Why the Model Penal Code's Sexual Offense Provisions Should be Pulled and Replaced,
I OHIO ST. J. CRI. L. 207 (2003).
218 Marital Immunity, supra note 2, at 1543.
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A current or previous dating or marital relationship shall not be sufficient to
constitute consent where consent is at issue in a prosecution under Section 261,
262, 286, 288a, or 289.219
Colorado and Minnesota have inserted similar language in their
respective definitions of consent in the context of their sexual offense
chapters. Colorado's definition provides:
"Consent" means cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free
will and with knowledge of the nature of the act. A current or previous
relationship shall not be sufficient to constitute consent under the provisions of
this part 4. Submission under the influence of fear shall not constitute
consent.
22 0
Minnesota's definition of consent includes the following language:
"Consent" means words or overt actions by a person indicating a freely given
present agreement to perform a particular sexual act with the actor. Consent
does not mean the existence of a prior or current social relationship between
the actor and the complainant or that the complainant failed to resist a
particular sexual act.22 1
Finally, the federal Uniform Code of Military Justice, that governs the
prosecution of persons in the armed forces, provides:
(A) The term "consent" means a freely given agreement to the conduct at issue
by a competent person. An expression of lack of consent through words or
conduct means there is no consent. Lack of verbal or physical resistance or
submission resulting from the use of force, threat of force, or placing another
person in fear does not constitute consent. A current or previous dating or
social or sexual relationship by itself or the manner of dress of the person
involved with the accused in the conduct at issue shall not constitute consent.
(B) A sleeping, unconscious, or incompetent person cannot consent. A person
cannot consent to force causing or likel!) to cause death or grievous bodily
harm or to being rendered unconscious. 22
219 CAL. PEN. CODE § 261.6 (2010) (explanatory parenthetical information and emphasis added).
220 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-401(1.5) (2013).
221 MINN. STAT. § 609.341 subd. 4(a) (2013) (emphasis added).
222 10 U.S.C.A. § 920, Art. 120(g)(8)(A), (B) (2013) (emphasis added). Ohio has adopted a version
of this Uniform Code for cases arising within the military in Ohio. The relevant provisions are:
(L)(1) An expression of lack of consent through words or conduct means there is no
consent. Lack of verbal or physical resistance or submission resulting from an accused's
use of force, threat of force, or placing another person in fear does not constitute consent. A
current orprevious dating relationship by itself or the manner of dress of a person involved
with the accused in the sexual conduct does not constitute consent.
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Undoubtedly, foresight in anticipating and resolving questions of
statutory interpretation is a hallmark of legislative acumen in general. In a
field of law as fraught with peril as rape law, such legislative foresight is
highly desirable, if not essential.
C. Develop and Promulgate Ohio Pattern Jury Instructions with
Appropriate Commentary
As a third and final step, the Ohio General Assembly should encourage
the Ohio Judicial Conference to develop a set of pattern jury instructions
that clearly articulates Ohio's rejection of the marital exemption and a
presumption of consent based on a current or former relationship between
the victim and the accused. This third step is critical because these reforms
will prove effective only if prosecutors, judges, and juries understand that
marital status is irrelevant in adjudicating sexual offenses. 223 When the
Ohio legislature partially lifted the marital exemption with respect to
forcible rape, a comment was added to the Pattern Jury Instructions on rape
stating: "forcible sexual conduct with a spouse is rape. The common law
(and statutory) defenses of implied consent and 'the wife is a man's chattel'
no longer exist. "224 In the same way, it is important to signal that neither
the historical nor more modern policy justifications for the marital
exemption still apply in cases of rape or other sexual offenses involving
spouses.
Jury instructions in rape cases have been the subject of considerable
controversy. American jurisdictions used to routinely give an instruction
that encapsulated Matthew Hale's cynical views about rape: "[I]t must be
remembered, that [rape] is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be
proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, [though] never so
innocent. 225 Some commentators have argued that the prevalence of rape
myths in society and amongst both judges and jurors226 make rape and
other sexual assault cases an area particularly in need of jury
(2) A person cannot consent to sexual conduct if the person is substantially incapable of
any of the following:
(a) Appraising the nature of the sexual conduct due to mental impairment or
unconsciousness resulting from consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a similar substance or
any other cause or to mental disease or defect that renders the person unable to understand
the nature of the sexual conduct[.] OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. § 5924.120 (West 2014)
(emphasis added).
Thus, military members are given more protection from sexual offenses while stationed in Ohio than
they would be if they had not been in the military. Id.
223 Marital Immunity, supra note 2, at 1547 ("This new law on sexual offenses by intimates would
authorize prosecutors to obtain jury instructions that would limit the jury's ability to infer consent from
a prior sexual relationship between the parties.").
224 2-CR 507 Oi 507.02(A)(1).
225 HALE, supra note 125, at 634.
226 Torrey, supra note 174, at 1017.
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instructions. 227  This third step completes the two earlier reforms by
addressing the problem on a less abstract, more concrete basis by educating
the fact finder about the relevant law and recent changes to it.
In summary, the Ohio General Assembly should take these three steps:
(1) eliminate references to "spouse" in its sexual offense provisions, (2)
explicitly state that marriage, cohabitation, or a previous sexual relationship
between offender and victim is legally irrelevant to charges of rape and
other sexual offenses, and (3) encourage the creation of jury instructions
that encapsulate the new law abrogating the marital exemption. In concert,
these steps would eliminate the marital immunity in its entirety. This will
demonstrate that all Ohioans, including those who are married, are afforded
the full protection of the criminal statutes outlawing sexual offenses. These
steps would resolve the problem of statutory ambiguity by clarifying that
not only marriage but other types of intimate sexual relationships as well
do not privilege assailants by protecting them from criminal charges.
Finally, they would communicate the results of this legislative mandate to
the relevant decision makers in our criminal justice system - the jury.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the political climate was favorable, [rape reform] proposals
often encountered resistance, particularly from defense attorneys within
state legislatures, who argued that the proposed changes would unfairly
impinge on the rights of defendants. Thus, reformers in many jurisdictions
were forced to delete changes from their reform packages or to substitute
weaker versions of particular changes. . . . In a number of jurisdictions,
reform bills were passed only after proponents abandoned their attempts to
eliminate the marital exemption for rape or agreed to a number of
exceptions to the rape shield statute. 228
More than forty years ago, and most recently in 1986 after considerable
debate, controversy, and ultimately compromise, 229 the Ohio General
Assembly partially lifted the marital exemption, clearing the way for the
criminal prosecution of perpetrators for rape and other sexual offenses
within marriage under a limited set of circumstances. Perhaps, the most
227 See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Pink Elephants in the Rape Trial: The Problem of Tort-Type Defenses in
the Criminal Law of Rape, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 203 (1997) (discussing the efficacy of
simple jury instructions telling jurors that "she asked for it" is not a defense).
228 Cassia C. Spohn, The Rape Reform Movement: The Traditional Common Law and Rape Law
Reforms, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 119, 121-22 (1999) (footnotes omitted). See also RUSSELL, supra note 119,
at 18 (1990) (quoting state legislators in Florida and California). Nourse argues that "Almost all
controversial legislation-and that includes rape reform-is purchased at the cost of deliberate
ambiguity. No piece of major legislation can obtain the collective consensus required by legislatures
without compromise." Nourse, supra note 104, at 958-59.
229 In her article, Siegel explored in some detail the move to abolish the marital immunity in Ohio.
Siegel, supra note 37, at 369-70; Spohn, supra note 228, at 117. See also RUSSELL, supra note 119,
discussing legislation in other states.
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important of these circumstances is when the defendant uses force or threat
of force to compel submission by the victim.2 30 From March 7, 1986 when
the last amendment took effect until today, no further significant 23'
progress has been made in the abolition of the marital exemption from
Ohio's rape statute or its other sexual offenses. Yet, in the three decades
since the legislature's partial lifting of the marital immunity much has
changed. A majority of American jurisdictions has done away with the
marital immunity in its entirety, and no jurisdiction in the United States
continues to use the full marital rape exemption. 232 England 233 and a
number of countries around the world have eliminated the exemption.234
There has been an avalanche of scholarly books235  and articles236
advocating the complete abolition of the marital immunity. Courts,
legislatures, and commentators have uniformly rejected the old policy
rationales for the exemption as outdated notions of marriage and women's
roles within marriage.237 Likewise, more "modern" justifications have
been severely critiqued and dismissed as indefensible. 238  Empirical
research has revealed the harm suffered by those who are raped or sexually
230 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G) (West 2013).
231 In 1990, the legislature did slightly alter the definition of spouse in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2907.01 (L) (2) & (3), such that the word "alimony" was replaced by "legal separation."
232 A recent article reports that "at least twenty-four states retain some form of an exemption. These
states criminalize a narrower range of offenses if committed within marriage, subject the marital rape
they recognize to less severe sanctions, and/or create special procedural obstacles to marital rape
prosecutions." Hasday, Protecting Them from Themselves, supra note 71, at 1465. But see Marital
Immunity, supra note 2, at 1522.
233 R v. R [1991] 2 All ER 257 (The House of Lords called it anachronistic and offensive.)
Subsequently, Parliament codified the elimination of the marital immunity. Criminal Justice and Public
Order Act, 1994 (Eng.); Fus, supra note 176, at 482.
234 According to one source, "By the time marital rape was criminalized in England, it was already
illegal in Scotland, eighteen American states, three Australian states, New Zealand, Canada, Israel,
France, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia." Francis Gibb,
Lords Say Rape is Rape in or out of Marriage, TIMES (London), Oct. 24, 1991, available at 1991
LEXIS, News Library, UK News Stories File. See also Wendy Larcombe & Mary Heath, Case Note,
Developing the Common Law and Rewriting the History of Rape in Marriage in Australia: PGA v The
Queen, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 785 (2012) (discussing Australian approach); Morgan Lee Woolley, Note,
Marital Rape: A Unique Blend of Domestic Violence and Non-Marital Rape Issues, 18 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 269 (2007) (describing the international trend to urge criminalization of marital rape).
Sonya A. Adamo, The Injustice of the Marital Rape Exemption: A Survey of Common Law Countries, 4
AM. U. J. INT'L. & POL'Y 555 (2012).
235 DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSH YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES
(1985); RUSSELL, supra note 119; PARTNER VIOLENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF 20 YEARS OF
RESEARCH (Jana L. Jasinki & Linda M. Williams eds. 1998).
236 See e.g., Judith A. Lincoln, Abolishing the Marital Rape Exemption: The First Step in Protecting
Married Women from Spousal Rape, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1219 (1995); Sallee Fry Waterman, For Better
or Worse: Marital Rape, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 611 (1988); Maria Pracher, The Marital Rape Exemption: A
Violation of a Woman's Right to Privacy, 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 717 (1981).
237 People v. Liberta, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 213 (1984); Siegel, supra note 37, at 378 ("The national
campaign for complete abolishment of the marital rape exemption has made great strides in its attempt
to legally change the sexist and archaic ideology that a woman is the property of her husband.).
238 Liberta, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213-15; Siegel, supra note 37, at 378.
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assault by their spouses. 239  Litigants launching constitutional Equal
Protection attacks on state rape statutes and their marital immunities have
succeeded and been emulated throughout the country.240 In 1994, the
United States Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act 2 4 1 and
awareness about domestic violence has blossomed in the intervening years.
Today, in an increasingly global or transnational world, the treatment of
women in and outside of marriage has been characterized as a major human
rights concern. 242
A series of recent, high-profile cases involving husbands who drugged
and raped their wives, sometimes videotaping these sexual assaults, have
highlighted the injustice of the marital rape exemption in Ohio. These
cases should provide the impetus for the Ohio legislature to rethink the
continued vitality of the marital exemption in its rape and other sexual
offenses. The cases illustrate in graphic detail the harm that befalls women
in marriage, not just when the offender uses his fists but when he subdues
his victim wife with intoxicating substances or engages in sexual contact
with a spouse who is unconscious or unaware of the sexual act. For those
reasons and the other rationales presented throughout this article, Ohio
should demonstrate its respect for women's sexual autonomy, physical
integrity, and human dignity by criminalizing all acts of sexual aggression
committed against them regardless of whether such heinous acts are
committed within or outside of marriage. The marital exemption to rape
and other sexual offenses should be abolished in its entirety.
APPENDIX I
The Three Statutory Exceptions to the Marital
Exemption in Ohio's Rape and Sexual Offense Provisions
I. Narrowest Exception with Broadest Applicability: The Definition of
Spouse
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (West 2013) Definitions (emphasis
added)
(L) "Spouse" means a person married to an offender at the time of an
alleged offense, except that such person shall not be considered the spouse
when any of the following apply:
When the parties have entered into a written separation agreement
authorized by section 3103.06 of the Revised Code;
During the pendency of an action between the parties for annulment,
divorce, dissolution of marriage, or legal separation;
239 See supra notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
240 See Decker & Baroni, supra note 134, at 1165.
241 Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701 - 14040 (1994).
242 See supra Part V.E.
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In the case of an action for legal separation, after the effective date of
the judgment for legal separation.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2013) Rape (emphasis added)
(A)(1) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another who is
not the spouse of the offender. . ., when any of the following applies: ...
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (West 2013) Sexual Battery
(emphasis added)
No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse
of the offender, when any of the following apply:...
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05 (West 2013) Gross Sexual Imposition
(emphasis added)
No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the
offender; cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to have sexual
contact with the offender; or cause two or more other persons to have
sexual contact when any of the following applies:...
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.06 (West 2013) Sexual Imposition
(emphasis added)
No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the
offender; cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to have sexual
contact with the offender; or cause two or more other persons to have
sexual contact when any of the following applies:...
II. Middle Exception with Moderate Applicability: Rape Statute's Living
Separate and Apart Language
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2013) Rape (emphasis added)
(A)(1) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another ... who
is the spouse of the offender but is living separate and apart from the
offender, when any of the following applies: ...
III. Broadest Exception with Narrowest Applicability: Forcible Rape
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2013) Rape (emphasis added)
(G) It is not a defense to a charge under division (A)(2) of this section
that the offender and the victim were married or were cohabiting at the
time of the commission of the offense.
No. 3/4]
